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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over this matter. The Appellant, S. Steven Maese, appeals a conviction of Speed-
ing, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code § 41-6a-601, but reduced by motion 
to an infraction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I. The Utah Constitution states," ... no person charged with the exer-
cise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted." Does the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers clause 
prevent prosecutors from designating the level of an offense or is lawmaking a 
merely advisory exercise? 
ST AN OARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Interpreting "the Utah Constitution is a question of law. We therefore review 
[the district court's decision] for correctness .... " 1 Maese preserved this issue by 
moving the trial court to dismiss the charges and by moving for a jury trial. 2 
POINT II. The Utah Supreme Court stated it observed a "virtually unanimous 
intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitu-
tional right to trial by jury in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases." 3 There-
fore, does Utah's constitutional right to a jury trial require jury trials for criminal 
infractions? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Again, interpreting "the Utah Constitution is a question of law. We therefore re-
view [ the district court's decision] for correctness .... " 4 Maese preserved this issue 
by moving the trial court for a jury trial. 5 
1 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 1 3, 268 P.3d 822 
2 R. at 117-127, 210-11. 
3 International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 
418,419 (Utah 1981). 
4 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 1 3, 268 P.3d 822 
s R. at 130-143. 
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTION AL 
PROVISIONS 
This Court's interpretation of the following rules, statutes, and constitutional 
provisions is important to the issues on appeal and their full texts, along with 
the trial court's findings and conclusions are attached at ADDENDUM A: 
RULES 
• Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(d); 
STATUTES 
• Utah Code§ 76-1-105. 
• Utah Code§ 76-1-103(1). 
• Utah Code § 76-3-402. 
CONSTITUTION AL PROVISIONS 
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. 
• Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 21, 2013, Clearfield City charged, by information, Santiago Steven 
Maese with Speeding, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code§ 41-6a-601.6 On 
November 13, 2014, the City amended the charge to an infraction.7 On January 
6 R. at 62. 
7 R. at 84. 
28, 2015 and on constitutional grounds, Maese moved for a jury trial. s The Justice 
Court denied the motion. 9 
Following a bench trial on July 8, 2015, Judge James L. Beesley convicted 
Maese of Speeding.10 Judge Beesley sentenced Maese to three days in jail, sus-
pending the jail upon payment of the fine. 11 Maese forfeited his posted bail.12 
Maese sought a trial de novo and the justice court sent the case to district 
court. 13 At the District court, on August 31, 2015, Maese moved to dismiss the 
charges.1-1 The District court denied Maese's motion.15 At trial on November 5, 
2015, Maese verbally moved for jury trial. Maese moved for the jury under the 
separation of powers argument detailed in his motion to dismiss. 16 The District 
court denied the Motion.17 The District court convicted Maese of Speeding.18 
8 R. at 42. 
9 R. at 39. 
10 R. at 17-18. 
11 Ibid. 
12 R. at 72. 
13 R. at 16 
14 R. at 117-127. 
15 R. at 169-170. 
16 R. at 210-11. 
17 Ibid. 
18 R. at 178-179. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 8, 2013, Trooper Scott Wilson of the Utah Highway patrol saw Santia-
go Steven Maese driving 15 miles per hour over the posted speed limit.19 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Courts throughout Utah rely on West Valley City v. McDonald for the proposition 
that amending a misdemeanor to an infraction is perfectly legal. 20 And in the un-
published Hurricane City v. Barlow, citing McDonald, this Court stated in a foot-
note it "has previously determined that a city may charge a speeding violation as 
an infraction rather than a class C misdemeanor." 21 But this is incorrect. 
McDonald holds that amending misdemeanors to infractions does not violate 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4( d). That holding is valid and Maese does not challenge it. But 
that Court specifically stated Utah constitutional arguments were unpreserved. 
Yet the Utah Constitution specifically separates powers between the branches 
of government granting the legislative branch exclusive authority to define of-
fenses and designate their penalties. Still, prosecutors across the state have 
usurped the essential legislative function of designating the penalties for offens-
es. By prosecuting a legislatively defined misdemeanor as an infraction, Clear-
19 R. at 213. 
20 West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
21 Hurricane City v. Barlow, 2009 UT App 115. 
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field City (an executive branch) impermissibly exercises an essential legislative 
function, violating Separation of Powers. 
One of the legal side effects of reducing misdemeanors to infractions - if not 
the very purpose-is depriving defendants of jury trials. But statutes and court 
rules barring jury trials for even the most minor criminal offense, an infraction, 
violate the Utah Constitution. The plain text of the Utah Constitution's jury trial 
provision, taken with the drafters' clear intent and historical traditions of that 
right in Utah, guarantee the right to trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions. Any 
law or rule to the contrary it unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Under the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers Clause, Cities Charg-
ing and Courts Adjudicating Legislatively-Designated Misdemeanors as 
Infractions is Prohibited. 
Allowing prosecutors to unilaterally designate a misdemeanor as an infraction is 
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers clause; only 
the legislature can define crimes and their penalties. 
A. Designating the penalty for an offense is an essential legislative function 
which cannot be assumed by, or delegated to, another branch. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Carter v. Lehi City that prosecuting crimes is 
the "quintessential executive act." 22 By charging and adjudicating legislatively-
designated misdemeanors as infractions, prosecutors and courts unconstitution-
ally usurps the essential legislative function of setting criminal penalties. No 
statement of law or legal principle allows prosecutors to exercise the essential 
legislative function of designating an offense's penalty. The Legislature never 
delegated such autho~ity to prosecutors or courts, nor could it under the Utah 
Constitution's Separation of Powers provision: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to ei-
22 Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ,r 46, 269 P.3d 141 (citations omitted). 
ther of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permit-
ted.23 
In State v. Gallion, the Utah Supreme Court stated the intent of Separation of 
Powers is to "prevent those, who exercise the power assigned by the Constitu-
tion to their department, from aggrandizement of their power, however derived, 
by exercising functions appertaining to another department." 24 
Gallion answered whether the Legislature properly delegated authority to the 
Utah Attorney General to add, delete, or reschedule substances proscribed by the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act. 25 The Utah Supreme Court held that delegation 
violated Separation of Powers because it delegated to an executive branch official 
the authority to define those same offenses and, effectively, fix their penalties. 26 
That Court stated: 
A determination of the elements of a crime and the appropriate punish-
ment therefor are, under our Constitutional system, judgments, which 
must be made exclusively by the legislature. 27 
The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essen-
tial legislative function with which it is thus vested. 28 
23 Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. 
24 State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977). 
25 Id. at 685. 
26 Id. at 689. 
27 Id. at 690. 
- 8 -
The power of the legislature to repeal or amend the penalty to be imposed 
for crime is not a matter of judicial concern. It is part of the sovereign pow-
er of the state, and it is the exclusive right of the legislature to change or 
amend it. 29 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court elucidated this bedrock principle 
nearly a century ago in Ex parte United States. 30 There, a federal district court 
judge declined to impose a mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by Con-
gress after taking into account "the peculiar circumstances" of the defendant 
which the judge reckoned warranted leniency. 31 The Court declined to recognize 
inherent judicial authority to disregard statutorily defined crimes and punish-
ments crafted through the legislative process. The Court explained: 
... if it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment 
for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial 
power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction, it 
would seem necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a 
discretionary authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge be-
cause of the conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought 
not to be treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the pos-
session by the judicial department of power to permanently refuse to en-
28 Id. at 687 (quoting Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 
Utah 227, 231, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935)). 
29 Id. at 688 (quoting Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380,381,483 P.2d 425 (1971)). 
30 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). 
31 See id. at 38-39. 
force a law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers of the 
other departments and hence leave no law to be enforced.32 
Where the overstepping judge in Ex parte United States actually considered 
facts and circumstances warranting leniency, here, the district court considered 
nothing before allowing a misdemeanor to be charged as an infraction. 
By designating speeding a misdemeanor, the Legislature determined that a 
jail sentence may be warranted, at least under some set of circumstances. But 
here, the prosecution decrees (and the trial court allows) that no set of circum-
stances exists warranting a jail sentence; not for a habitual violator; not for put-
ting others in extreme danger. In this case, the trial court "permanently set aside" 
a "plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment for crime," without 
inquiring into the offense's underlying factual allegations or the offender. 
Beyond State v. Gallion and Ex parte United States, we find another Utah ana-
logue in State v. Mohi. There, the Utah Supreme Court struck a statute allowing 
prosecutors to choose, with no statutory guidance, whether to prosecute minors 
charged with serious offenses as juveniles or adults, as unconstitutional.33 It 
stressed that "the classic 'prosecutorial discretion' question is which law to apply 
32 Id. at 42. 
33 State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1006 (Utah 1995) The Mohi Court never considered 
whether the statute violated Separation of Powers, but found it violated 
Utah's Uniform Operation of Laws provision. 
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to an offender rather than how to apply the same law to different offenders." 34 To 
that end, "Once an offender is charged with a particular crime, that offender 
must be subjected to the same or substantially similar procedures and exposed to 
the same level of jeopardy as all other offenders so charged to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirement of uniform operation of the laws." 35 
By accepting an amendment of statutory misdemeanors to infractions, the tri-
al court improperly permitted Clearfield to assume the essential legislative func-
tion of fixing the penalty for Speeding. This contradicts the Utah Constitution's 
mandate that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one ... department[], shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others." 36 
Under the Utah Constitution, only the legislature has the power to define 
crimes and prescribe penalties. 
B. Utali Code designates speeding a misdemeanor and proliibits any reduc-
tion in tlie level of an offense before conviction. 
Although the Utah Constitution prohibits executive and judicial authority to re-
duce misdemeanors to infractions, Utah Code is equally clear on the subject. 
34 Id. at 1004 (citation omitted) (emphasis by the Court). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Utah Const. art. V, § 1. 
~11 ~ 
Long ago the Utah Legislature abolished common law crimes providing that 
"no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or 
ordinance." 37 The Code designates offenses as "felonies, misdemeanors, or in-
fractions." 38 And the Legislature determined "[a]ny offense which is an infrac-
tion within this code is expressly designated ... " 39 At the time of Maese's offense, 
the Legislature designated that a "violation of any provision of the [Traffic Code] 
is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided." 40 Subsequently, the Legis-
lature redesignated much of the Traffic Code, amending most violations to in-
fractions, but it retained speeding as a class C misdemeanor.41 Finally, and most 
importantly, the Legislature mandates that "[t]he provisions of this code shall 
govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any offense 
defined in this code." 42 
37 Utah Code§ 76-1-105. 
3s Utah Code§ 76-3-102 (2013). 
39 Utah Code § 76-3-105. 
40 Utah Code § 41-6a-202(2) (2013). 
41 See H.B. 348, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015) (amending Utah Code § 41-6a-
202(2) to make all traffic offenses infractions "unless otherwise provided," 
and adding language specifically providing that speeding is a class C misde-
meanor). 
-12 Utah Code§ 76-1-103(1) (emphasis added). 
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Unquestionably, the above code governs the designation of offenses. But this 
Court's decision in West Valley City v. McDonald implies that prosecutors are free 
to reduce misdemeanors to infractions. So a thought experiment: If an executive 
can choose to reduce an offense's designation at will, what prevents it from in-
creasing an offense's designation? Utah Code. We have no prosecutions for felo-
ny jaywalking, nor infraction homicide, because of Utah Code. An offense's 
designation can be no more, and no less, than what statute mandates. 
The trial court questioned whether Maese' s interpretation would prohibit 
prosecutorial discretion to plea bargain.43 The answer, again, lies in Utah Code. 
Another thought experiment: Without using distinguishable facts, could an ex-
ecutive plea bargain capital murder to a class C misdemeanor? Theoretically, yes. 
But this is because of lesser included offenses: Capital homicide ( death penalty) 
could be charged as aggravated murder, a first degree felony (25 to life); aggra-
vated murder could be charged as murder (15 to life), a first degree felony; mur-
der could be charged as attempted murder, a second degree felony; attempted 
murder could be charged as aggravated assault, either a second or third degree 
felony; aggravated assault could be charged as attempted aggravated assault, a 
Class A misdemeanor; attempted aggravated assault could be charged as assault, 
a Class B misdemeanor; assault could be charged as attempted assault, a Class C 
43 See R. at 192. 
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misdemeanor. And all of these charges are permissible under the same facts as 
lesser included offenses. This example shows prosecutors' ability to pick which 
crime to charge. But charging homicide as an infraction is impossible under the 
statutory scheme. Charging speeding as an infraction is equally impossible. 
At the time of the offense, the Legislature designated speeding as a class C 
misdemeanor under its catchall provision,44 and it has since done so explicitly.45 
Although the Legislature prescribes a precise process to reduce the level of an of-
fense after conviction, 46 it prescribes no such process for reducing an offense's 
designation before conviction. 
In this case, the trial court allowed Clearfield to charge speeding as an infrac-
tion, despite Utah Code designating it a Class C Misdemeanor. This charge is 
nonexistent and therefore contrary to Utah Code. 
C. The only mechanism for reducing an offense's designation must be in-
voked post-conviction. 
In State v. Barrett, the Utah Supreme Court suggested a court commits a "rogue" 
act by reducing the degree of an offense without legislative authorization.47 Bar-
44 See Utah Code§ 41-6a-601. (2013) 
45 See Utah Code§ 41-6a-601(4) (2015) (speeding "is a class C misdemeanor"). 
46 See Utah Code§ 76-3-402 "Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure 
and limitations" 
47 State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, , 13, 217 P.3d 682. 
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rett held the trial court abused its discretion by reducing a conviction two levels 
without agreement from the prosecution, as required under section 76-3-402.48 
The processes prescribed for reducing offenses after conviction, or through 
the prosecution of inchoate offenses, -19 would be superfluous if prosecutors and 
judges were free to do so at whim. In Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, this 
Court stated that courts must "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative," thus "when two statutory provisions conflict 
in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the 
more general provision." 50 No provision of Utah Code permits reducing the level 
of offense before conviction. Thus the specific provisions governing reductions of 
offenses, section 402, must govern. 
D. Tlte Utalt Supreme Court's rulemaking autltority cannot pennit a cltange 
in a criminal offense's designation. 
The plain language of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure grants no 
authority to accept an amended information reducing an offense's statutory des-
-18 Id. at ,r 46. 
49 See Utah Code§§ 76-4-101 through -401; for instance, an attempt to commit a 
class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor (see Utah Code § 76-4-
102(1 )(h). ). 
50 Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ,r 15, 24 P.3d 958 (citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
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ignation. Rule 4 never provides that speeding is an infraction, nor does it provide 
or so much as imply the authority to reduce the level of an offense. 
The Utah Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is limited by constitution 
and statute to rules relating to "procedure and evidence for use in the courts." 51 
In Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, the Utah Supreme Court distin-
guished between procedural and substantive rules, which lie outside of its rule-
making authority: 
Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, 
method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substan-
tive rights or obtains redress for the invasion. 'Practice and procedure' 
may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the 
product thereof s2 
By permitting the arbitrary designation of offense levels, courts impermissibly 
determine the substantive "product" of the judicial process. In this case, the trial 
court has decreed not a procedural step, but the outcome of the process-a con-
viction or acquittal for an infraction rather than a misdemeanor. 
51 Utah Const. art. VIII,§ 4; Utah Code§ 78A-3-103(1). 
52 Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Avila South Condominium Assoc. v. Kappa Corp., Fla., 347 So.2d 599, 608 
(1977)). 
Also, the trial court's reliance on West Valley City v. McDonald is misplaced. 53 
Given the arguments before it, this Court in McDonald was necessarily limited to 
considering the rights of the defendant under Rule 4. Whereas here, Maese chal-
lenges the authority of courts and prosecutors to designate the penalty for an of-
fense under the Utah Constitution. Just as the First Amendment does not 
explicitly prohibit treasonous speech, it does not permit it either. At that, this 
Court in McDonald never addressed whether an interpretation of Rule 4 that 
permits the amendment of a misdemeanor to an infraction exceeded courts' 
rulemaking authority or violated Separation of Powers. It does both. 
The McDonald Court acknowledged, "The charge in the amended infor-
mation- speeding ... -was exactly the same as in the original information; only 
the classification, and therefore the penalty, was changed." 54 Prosecutors and judges 
enjoy no authority under Utah law to change the penalty for an offense. 
Accordingly, under the interpretive maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
("the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of the alternative"),55 the Legislature 
prohibits the prosecutorial and judicial authority claimed here. That is, the Legis-
53 See Ruling & Order, p. 3, ,r 1 (citing McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997)). 
54 West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (em-
phasis added). 
55 Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, if 15, 158 P.3d 540. 
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lature has expressed when and how the level of an offense may be reduced-
after conviction, by the court, upon a number of certain findings, and limited by 
certain conditions - meaning it cannot be done otherwise. 56 And, as discussed 
above, to do so violates the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers provision. 
E. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an offense not 
designated in Utah Code. Its only authority is to dismiss. 
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 25, "The court shall dismiss the infor-
mation or indictment when ... [t]he court is without jurisdiction .... " 57 In Thomp-
son v. Jackson, this Court stated subject matter jurisdiction "is the power and 
authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot 
proceed." 58 "If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void." 59 In 
State v. Todd it stated subject matter jurisdiction "is derived from the law."60 "It 
can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused." 61 In criminal 
cases, "[t]he trial court simply would lack the judicial power to convict the de-
56 See Utah Code § 76-3-402. 
57 Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(4). 
58 Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
59 Ibid. 
60 State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, ,r 9, 98 P.3d 46. 
61 Ibid. 
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fendant of a nonexistent crime." 62 "Upon a determination by the Court that its ju-
risdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further than to dismiss the action." 63 
In Utah Code, infraction speeding is nonexistent. Utah courts lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over non-existent offenses. Accordingly, the trial court retains 
only the authority to dismiss the action against Maese. 
POINT II. The Utah Constitution Unequivocally Guarantees Defendants Charged 
with Infractions the Right of Trial by Jury. 
Analyzing the Utah Constitution's text, historical context, and Utah's traditions 
at the time of its adoption reveals the Constitution guarantees the right to jury 
trials in all criminal cases, including prosecutions for infractions. Yet Utah Code 
and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide jury trials for all offenses ex-
cept infractions. 64 
The framers of the Utah Constitution, however, viewed the right of a trial by 
jury as sacrosanct in all criminal and civil cases, and conceived of no circum-
stance by which that right should be denied; including the right to a jury trial for 
so-called "petty" offenses which was well established in the Utah territory long 
before, and in the state long after, the Constitution was adopted. 
62 State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ,I 21, 97 P.3d 732. 
63 Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omit-
ted). 
6-1 See Utah Code§ 77-1-6(2)(e); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(d). 
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Accordingly, any Utah statute or procedural rule denying the right of a jury 
trial in prosecutions for infractions is unconstitutional. 
A. The plain language of tlte Utali Constitution guarantees the right to jury 
trials in all cases. 
In American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court stated when 
courts interpret the Utah Constitution, courts should II analyze its text, historical 
evidence of the state of the law when it was drafted, and Utah's particular tradi-
tions at the time of drafting." 65 A court's goal is to II discern the intent and pur-
pose of both the drafters of our constitution and, more importantly, the citizens 
who voted it into effect." 66 
In State v. Hernandez, the Utah Supreme Court stated because II the best evi-
dence of the drafters' intent is the text itself, our analysis begins with a review of 
the constitutional text." 67 And in Salt Lake City v. Ohms, it stated, 11 if a constitu-
tional provision is clear, then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may 
not be resorted to."68 
In its current state, Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution states: 
65 Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, if 12, 140 P.3d 1235. 
66 Ibid. 
67 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ,r 8,268 P.3d 822 (citations and quotations omit-
ted). 
68 Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850, n. 14 (Utah 1994). 
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In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital 
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, 
the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the 
Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 69 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution states in relevant part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed ... 70 
In 1996, a ballot measure amended Article I, § 10 to accommodate the consoli-
dation of circuit courts into the district court system. 71 The original provision 
stated: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths 
of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded.72 
Here, sections 10 and 12 are plain and unambiguous. These provisions guar-
antee the right of a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. Section 10 addresses ju-
69 Utah Const. Art. I, § 10. 
70 Utah Const. Art. I,§ 12. 
71 Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 12-13, December 8, 
1995, attached in Addendum B. 
72 Utah Const. Art. I, § 10 (1896). 
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ry trials in general, and by the language, "In other cases, the Legislature shall es-
tablish the number of jurors," "in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four 
persons," and "In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous," the section 
contemplates no situation where a defendant in a criminal action would not be 
entitled to a jury. 
If the drafters intended to limit the right based on the possibility of incarcera-
tion, they would have stated so explicitly. Section 12 addresses the rights of crim-
inal defendants in particular, stating, "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." This lan-
guage is also unequivocal, making no provision for a prosecution lacking the 
right to a jury trial. 
B. The framers conceived of no circumstance, whether civil or criminal, un-
der which the right to trial by jury sliould be denied. 
Assuming ambiguous text, the Utah Supreme Court stated constitutional inter-
pretation may also be informed by "historical evidence of the drafters' intent." 73 
In Intern. Han,ester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, the Utah Supreme Court squarely 
held that article I,§ 10 guarantees the right to a jury trial in all civil cases. The 
court's reasoning there was equally if not more applicable to criminal jury trials: 
73 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 18,268 P.3d 822 (citations and alterations omit-
ted). 
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The wording of Article I, § 10 lends itself to argument over the intended 
meaning as to noncapital criminal cases and civil cases .... A careful read-
ing, however, of the proceedings of the constitutional convention, Official 
Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, 1895, Vol. I, Pages 
258-62, 274-97, 492-95, discloses a virtually unanimous intention on the 
part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right 
to trial by jun1 in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases. 
Although there was dispute in the convention over the number of jurors, 
and the degree of concurrence necessary for a verdict, there is repeated 
reference to the intention to insure the underlying right of trial by jury. The 
whole tenor of the discussion in the constitutional convention, the prelimi-
nary drafts, and the final language of Article I,§ 10, indicates no intention 
to limit the constitutional right to a jury to capital criminal cases . 
. . . the constitutional designation of the number of jurors to be used in 
courts of original jurisdiction and in courts of inferior jurisdiction presup-
poses the existence of the basic right itself. It is not plausible that the fram-
ers would mandate the number of jurors to be used in a jury, and the 
number of jurors required to return a verdict, without intending to secure 
the basic right itself. 
The jury historically has been an integral part of the Anglo-American legal 
system. It would require the clearest language to sustain the conclusion 
that there was an intention to abolish an institution so deeply rooted in 
our basic democratic traditions and so important in the administration of 
justice, not only as a buff er between the state and the sovereign citizens of 
the state, but also as a means for rendering justice between citizens. We re-
fuse to give a strained meaning to the terms of our Constitution which 
would result in dispensing with an institution that has the sanction of the 
centuries. 74 
74 Intern. Harvester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418, 419-20 (Utah 1981) (em-
phasis added). 
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Thus, whether infractions are criminal or civil in nature, there is no question 
that Maese was entitled to a jury trial. 
Indeed, the debate over the original provision never considered circumstances 
whereby a civil litigant or criminal defendant would be denied the right to trial 
by jury. The debate was whether the number of jurors in any case should remain 
at 12, or be reducible by constitution or statute. And no delegate understood the 
right to be limited by the potential punishment attached to an offense. In fact, ar-
guing against the ultimately successful reduction in the number of jurors for 
noncapital felonies and "other cases," delegate John Rutledge Bowdle said: 
I claim that a man's liberty is not in jeopardy only when the doors of the 
penitentiary may stand before him, or when his life is at stake. His reputa-
tion might be just as sacred, or more sacred than his life. I believe that 
when a man is on trial for any crime he should have a fair and impartial 
trial by a jury, as the gentleman concedes, the best jury, that is a jury of 
twelve ... 75 
The 1996 article I, section 10 amendment explicitly intended a technical rather 
than substantive change. Members of the Constitutional Revision Committee 
which proposed the amendment to the Legislature, including two now-former 
Utah Supreme Court chief justices, never intended to alter the substance of the 
right as it has stood since the founding. The reason for the amendment was to 
75 Official Report of The Proceedings And Debates Of The Convention Assem-
bled To Adopt A Constitution For The State Of Utah, 291-92 (1898), attached 
in Addendum B. 
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address the consolidation of inferior circuit courts with general jurisdiction dis-
trict courts by establishing jury size based upon the type of case at issue rather 
than the type of court. 76 
The Utah Constitutional Revision Commission understood that Utah courts 
have not determined if Utah's constitutional jury right extends to those charged 
with petty offenses or infractions, and they never intended for the amendment to 
resolve that issue. 
Mr. James Housley, Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County .. . _ex-
pressed concern that one could argue that people are entitled to a jury tri-
al, even for petty offenses. Under federal constitutional provisions there 
have been a number of cases that have differentiated between petty cases 
and serious cases, he said. The differentiation is basically at six months po-
tential incarceration but Utah Supreme Court cases have discussed the dif-
ferentiation without actually holding that this is what is covered by the 
state constitution. He said they would likely not be precluded from using 
the federal interpretation. He requested that the use of the word 'shall' not 
be intended to change the jurisprudence surrounding the right to jury tri-
al.77 
Then-Chief Justice Michael Zimmerman stated the Commission's "express in-
tention is not to change anything and not to affect existing case law." 78 Zimmer-
76 Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 12-13, December 8, 
1995, attached in Addendum B; Proposition No. 3: Jury Trial Resolution, Utah 
Voter Information Pamphlet, p. 27, 1996, attached in Addendum B. 
77 Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 14-15, December 8, 
1995. 
78 Id., p. 13. 
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man's successor at the high court, Justice Christine Durham, agreed, indicating 
"the Judicial Council's motivation in proposing the amendment was to maintain 
the operational status quo under the constitution." 79 Yet the article I,§ 10, 
amendment drafters could have easily restricted the right to offenses carrying the 
possibility of incarceration, but consciously refrained. 
In fact, early drafts of the proposed 1996 amendment, which took the form of 
a joint resolution of the Utah Legislature, explicitly limited the right, stating, 
"Parties have the right to trial by jury in any criminal case in which the Legisla-
ture has established a term of incarceration as a possible sentence." 80 But these 
were ultimately rejected. 
The article I, section 10 drafters-at the time of the framing, and a century lat-
er with the amendment- demonstrated no intention to restrict the jury trial right 
based on the possibility of incarceration. 
C. Utah's traditions when the constitution was adopted entitled those 
charged witli petty offenses to jury trials. 
In State v. Hernandez, the Utah Supreme Court largely gleaned the framers' un-
derstanding of the right to a preliminary hearing in criminal cases by referring to 
79 Id., p. 15. 
80 See Jury Trial Resolution, 1996 General Session, November 27, 1995 Draft, 
1996FL-0689/003, attached in Addendum B . 
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the territorial laws in force at the time. 81 In finding that defendants have a consti-
tutional right to preliminary hearings in prosecutions for class A misdemeanors, 
despite no such federal right, the court stressed that Article XXIV, § 2 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that II All laws of the Territory of Utah now in force, not 
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their 
own limitations, or are altered or repealed by the Legislature." 82 Thus, the Her-
nandez Court ultimately applied the definition of indictable offenses found in the 
Utah territorial laws. 
By the same thinking, whether a defendant charged with an infraction is enti-
tled to a trial by jury turns on the framers' understanding, the original public 
meaning of the terms II criminal cases" and II criminal prosecutions," as used in 
Article I, §§ 10 and 12. At the time of the framing, Utah territorial law provided: 
A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a 
law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon convic-
tion, either of the following punishments: 
1. Death. 
2. Imprisonment. 
3. Fine. 
4. Removal from office; or, 
81 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, iiii 11-21, 268 P.3d 822. 
82 Id. at ii 12. 
5. Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust 
or profit in this Territory.83 
Accordingly, criminal offenses were not restricted to those punishable by 
death or imprisonment, but also included those punishable by fine, removal from 
office, or disqualification. The territorial law at the time of the framing stated, 11ls-
sues of fact must be tried by jury unless a trial by jury be waived in criminal cas-
es not amounting to felony ... "84 
Infractions under current Utah Code are materially the same: They are pun-
ishable by fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination. 85 Moreover, 
the territorial Penal Code at the time of the framing defined numerous crimes not 
punishable by imprisonment, or punishable by imprisonment of six months or 
less,86 the benchmark for "petty offenses" under federal constitutional jurispru-
dence beyond which a jury trial is guaranteed. 87 
83 UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4378 (1888) (emphasis added), attached in Addendum 
B. 
84 UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 5318 (1888), attached in Addendum B. 
85 Utah Code § 76-3-201(2). 
86 See UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4401 (1888) (Taking rewards for deputation, pun-
ishable by $1,000 fine); § 4438 (Refusing to aid officers in arrest, etc., punisha-
ble by $100 fine); § 4479 (Duties of officers to prevent duels, punishable by 
$500 fine); § 4484 (Assault, punishable by $300 fine and three months jail); § 
4515 (Keeping open places of business on Sunday, punishable by $5-$100 fi-
ne);§ 4519 (Performing unnecessary labor on Sunday, punishable by $25 fine); 
§ 4522 (Selling liquor at camp or field meetings, punishable by $5-$500 fine);§ 
Defendants charged with offenses not punishable by imprisonment or with 
so-called "petty offenses," routinely demanded and received jury trials in justice 
courts around the time of the framing of the Utah Constitution.88 
4524 (Procuring females to play on musical instruments in public, punishable 
by $100 fine and one month jail); § 4525 (Procuring female to exhibit herself 
for hire, punishable by $100 fine and one month jail); § 4573 (Putting extrane-
ous substances in packages of goods usually sold by weight with intent to in-
crease weight, punishable by $25 fine for each offense);§ 4598 (Disturbing the 
peace, punishable by $200 fine and two months jail), attached in Addendum 
B. 
s7 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that potential impris-
onment of greater than six months triggers right to jury trial under Sixth 
Amendment). 
88 See e.g., Box Elder News, "Jury Disagrees," July 29, 1915 (defendants charged 
under city ordinance for failing to gain permission to sell fruit on railroad 
company land, punishable by fine of $5 to $100, demanded and received a ju-
ry trial in justice court, resulting in a hung jury); Deseret Evening News, "Po-
lice Court," September 27, 1893 ( defendant charged with violating ordinance 
related to sewer connections tried by jury in justice of the peace court); 
Deseret Evening News, "A Jury Trial," April 24, 1895 ( defendant demanded 
jury trial for vagrancy charge); Deseret Evening News, "Today's Police 
Court," July 10, 1895 (defendant charged with building code ordinance re-
ceived jury trial); Deseret Evening News, "Police Court," October 14, 1895 
(defendant received jury trial for vagrancy); Deseret Evening News, "Police 
Court Notes," February 12, 1897 (defendant set for trial for allowing females 
in place of business after 9 p.m.); Deseret Evening News, "Demanded a Jury 
Trial," March 22, 1897 ( defendant demanded and received jury trial for 
drunkenness); Deseret News, "Those Vagrancy Cases: Sentences in Six of 
Them Were Corrected With the City System," July 1, 1901 (defendant found 
guilty of vagrancy in jury trial); Deseret News, "Jury in Vagrancy Case," Feb-
ruary 24, 1909 ( defendant received jury trial in vagrancy case, punishable by 
More than a century ago, in Salt Lake City v. Robinson, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a very similar issue in determining whether punishment for violations 
of municipal ordinances was civil or criminal in nature, the Court stated: 
the courts of this state have always regarded the proceedings instituted for 
violations of ordinances as in their nature criminal, and not civil. Trials, so 
far, as we are aware have always been conducted upon that theory. Again 
the rules of evidence and the quantum of proof, as well as the rules of con-
struction and procedure applicable to criminal prosecutions, have always 
been applied and enforced in prosecutions for violations of city ordinances 
by the courts of this state .... We are clearly of the opinion that, under our 
statutes, prosecutions like the one at bar are in their nature criminal, and 
that the rules pertaining to criminal prosecutions for misdemeanors under 
the statute are applicable. 89 
The same is true of infractions. That is, the rules of evidence, the quantum of 
proof, and the rules of construction are the same in a prosecution for a felony, 
misdemeanor, or infraction. The action is prosecuted by information in the name 
of a governmental entity rather than a private party. The action is subject to the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants are subject to arrest for an infraction, and may be arrested if they fail 
to appear and face the charge of an infraction, rather than face default judgment 
three months jail); Deseret News, "Busy Day in Ogden Police Court: Continu-
ous Session of Eight Hours- Jury Failed to Agree on Walter Smith's case," 
March 4, 1903 ( defendant tried by jury for disturbing the peace, punishable by 
$200 fine and two months jail), attached in Addendum B. 
89 Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 P.442 (Utah 1911). 
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in a civil action for failing to timely answer. There is also no question that the 
drafters of the "Utah Criminal Code" intended infractions to be "in their nature 
criminal," when they designated criminal offenses as "felonies, misdemeanors, 
or infractions." 90 
Utah's traditions at the time the Constitution was adopted entitled defendants 
to juries even for petty offenses, like infractions. 
CONCLUSION 
Maese respectfully requests this Court grant his appeal, declare as unconstitu-
tional the practice of amending misdemeanors to infractions, declare as unconsti-
tutional Utah Code subsection 77-1-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of Criminal Procedure, 
and order Judge John Morris to dismiss the Amended Information against Maese 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner also requests costs and, under 
the Court's equitable powers, attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 27th day of April, 2016. 
90 Utah Code § 76-3-102. 
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ADDENDUM A 
(RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS) 
Oral Arguments - September 28, 2015 
1 THE COURT: I'm just going to reiterate that McDonald 
2 did not address the Utah Constitution. Period. My argument 
3 distinguishes between the federal constitution's petty offense 
4 kind of cutoff level and that of the Utah Constitution. At the 
5 time of the framing, petty offenses were entitled to jury 
6 trials, number one. Number two, the City argues that 4(d) 
7 permits this authority. Nowhere in 4(d) does it say you can 
8 reduce the level of offense. 4(d) says you can amend an 
9 information and charge a different offense if the substantial 
10 rights of so and so aren't impacted. 4(d) doesn't explicitly 
11 prohibit this, but it cannot permit it, and it doesn't by its 
12 plain terms permit it. It's been used when it was challenged, 
13 when the defendant in McDonald said I have a right to a jury 
14 trial; therefore, under 4(d), the amendment of the information 
15 has impacted my rights, the court said no actually it did not 
16 because you don't have a right to a jury trial under the 
17 federal constitution if you're charged with a petty offense. 
18 And we're not going to reach your claim that you have 
19 a right to a jury trial under the state constitution because 
20 you failed to raise it below. So 4(d) does not prohibit what's 
21 being claimed here, but it cannot permit it under the Court's 
22 limited rule making authority and under separation of powers. 
23 And I'll leave it at that. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. Let me address the 
25 first motion. I assume that's the motion for a jury trial. I 
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Oral Arguments - September 28, 2015 
1 struggle with getting past West Valley City v. McDonald, which 
2 I did believe held that if you reduce a misdemeanor charge to 
3 an infraction, the possibility of jail time evaporates and that 
4 therefore under Rule 17(d) the defendant is not entitled to a 
5 jury trial. The trial courts are the inferior courts. The 
6 appellate courts, if they have ruled on a case, have 
7 established by that ruling precedent which the trial courts 
8 must follow. I find that I'm unable to distinguish McDonald and 
9 would therefore have to conclude that in fact no jury trial 
10 would be allowed for an infraction. 
11 Now, addressing the other motion to dismiss, which 
12 invokes separation of powers, to my mind, I think the 
13 (inaudible) here is trying to prove too much. The defendant was 
14 charged with an offense, and an existing offense, and therefore 
15 I believe the courts have jurisdiction. Subject matter 
16 jurisdiction. And I guess the defendant, the appellant here, is 
17 arguing that the prosecutor doesn't have the authority to 
18 reduce the offense to an infraction. And because he doesn't 
19 have that authority, it removes the Court's subject matter 
20 jurisdiction because he's being charged essentially with an 
21 offense that doesn't exist. 
22 Again, as I asked counsel, I do believe there's a 
23 difference between the elements of the offense and the degree 
24 of the offense. The existence of the elements of the offense 
25 means it is a crime and the Court has subject matter 
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Oral Arguments - September 28, 2015 
1 jurisdiction. The degree of the offense is generally charged as 
2 provided. But here, we get into the authority of the prosecutor 
3 to in fact prosecute the case in a manner which serves the 
4 public interest and in accordance with the authority which it 
5 was granted by applicable law, statutory decision or 
6 constitutional. 
7 So the argument that the prosecutor may not do this I 
8 think goes a bit too far. The legislature gave City attorneys 
9 the authority to prosecute certain criminal matters and the 
10 authority extends from the constitution itself, which was all 
11 cited, and was then embodied in the Utah code. Inherent in the 
12 authority to prosecute would be the discretion or in the area 
13 of how to move a case forward, prosecutorial discretion. I 
14 don't see any problem with prosecutorial authority. It's 
15 granted by the constitution as implemented by the legislature. 
16 The prosecutors have the authority to bring charges, dismiss 
17 charges, amend charges. They can, in fact, enter into diversion 
18 types of agreements. Pleas in abeyance, for instance. 
19 Prosecutors also have the authority to reduce the 
20 degree of charges for any one of a number of reasons. Perhaps 
21 the most important of which is that it affects sentencing. But 
22 it also affects the ability or the impact a charge may have in 
23 other areas of a defendant's life and whether or not that 
24 charge in fact at some point can be removed from the record. So 
25 the decision to reduce the misdemeanor traffic infraction--
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1 violation to an infraction appear to be within the authority 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
delegated to the prosecutor by the legislature, thus the 
authority to prosecute cases and determine how that should go 
forward. I don't find a violation of separation of powers in 
the reduction of this charge to a misdemeanor. So I will 
specifically find no violation of separation of powers. I will 
7 find the prosecutor has the authority and the discretion to 
8 prosecute cases as they choose and within the authority which 
9 was conferred by our legislature, which does include some 
10 discretion. And so I'm afraid I can't get there either. So I 
11 will deny that motion as well. 
12 
13 
So, gentlemen, where are we going from here? 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, Your Honor, I wonder if we can 
14 discuss with the prosecution about a potential resolution? 
15 
16 
(Counsel confer) 
THE COURT: You can use the conference room and I'll 
17 just finish my calendar. 
18 (PROCEEDING CONCLUDED) 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 C E R T I F I C A T E 
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS 
801-285-9495 / thackertranscri pts@Jrrei I. com 
000201 
16 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
Utah Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As amended through January 1, 2016 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn 
to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in 
concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. If 
issued, the information shall include the citation number. Failure to include the number will not 
affect the court's jurisdiction. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. 
Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged 
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written instruments, 
pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or description by which they are 
generally known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details 
concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law 
nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before trial has commenced 
so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. If an additional or different 
offense is charged, the defendant has the right to a preliminary hearing on that offense as 
provided under these rules and any continuance as necessary to meet the amendment. The court 
may permit an indictment or information to be amended after the trial has commenced but before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant 
are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the 
offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a defendant of the 
nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the 
defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment 
or within 14 days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its 
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or 
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and 
contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set 
forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained therein may 
be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the statute 
creating or defining the offense. 
vi (h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless they are 
otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or 
information. 
0) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based shall be 
endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement 
shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting 
...J attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he 
proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before the 
magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall 
be the same as against a natural person. 
History. Amended effective April 1, 2012; November 1, 2015. 
§ 76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished. 
Utah Statutes 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 1. General Provisions 
Current through 3-28-2016 
§ 76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished 
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other 
applicable statute or ordinance. 
Cite as Utah Code§ 76-1-105 
History. Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session 
·,J 
§ 76-1-103. Application of code - Offense prior to effective date. 
Utah Statutes 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 1. General Provisions 
Current through 3-28-2016 
§ 76-1-103. Application of code - Offense prior to effective date 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and 
defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where otherwise specifically 
provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this code; 
provided such offense was committed after the effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be governed by the 
law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of commission thereof, except that a 
defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall be available to any 
defendant tried or retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state 
shall be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the 
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto. 
Cite as Utah Code§ 76-1-103 
History. Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure and limitations. 
Utah Statutes 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 3. Punishments 
Current through 3-28-2016 
§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure and limitations 
(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, and after having given any victims present at the sentencing and the 
prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court 
may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on 
probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition of probation, the 
court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense: 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation; 
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney; 
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to provide 
notice to any victims; 
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); and 
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense is in the interest of justice. 
(3) (a) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, whether the 
reduction is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the prosecutor specifically 
agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two 
degrees. 
(b) In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than two 
degrees. 
(4) This section does not preclude any person from obtaining or being granted an 
expungement of his record as provided by law. 
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(5) The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense if: 
(a) the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or 
(b) if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the offense for which 
the reduction is sought. 
(6) When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under this section, the 
actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made may not be altered. 
(7) (a) A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a conviction that requires 
the person to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements under 
Title 77, Chapter 41, Sex and Kidnap Offender Registry, have expired. 
(b) A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under 
Subsection 77-41-105(3)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for 
the offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender. 
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an offense regarding 
which: 
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would 
increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence: and 
(b) the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section. 
Cite as Utah Code § 76-3-402 
History. Amended by Chapter 145, 2012 General Session, §12, eff. 5/8/2012. 
Amended by Chapter 103, 2007 General Session 
§ 10. Trial by jury. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Current through November 3, 2015 
§ 10. Trial by jury 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist 
of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight 
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no 
event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 
§ 1. Three departments of government. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Current through November 3, 2015 
§ 1. Three departments of government 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
vJJ the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
§ 12. Rights of accused persons. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Current through November 3, 2015 
§ 12. Rights of accused persons 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by 
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined 
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or 
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
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not reflect an intentjon to change the statutory scheme or existing law. 
Chair McKcachnie stated that the comrnhsion did not formally addre.i..s the intent 
language noted on page 94 of the packet 
Mr. Bird stated that the voter infonnation pamphlet could indicate that the commission 
recommended and the legislature passed a resolution that appears to be antiquated and redundant 
language and that there is no intent ro make a substantive change to law. 
MOTION: Mr. Jensen moved to include. in the House and Senate Journals. and in the 
voter information pamphlet~ the intent language;This deletion is not intended to make a 
substanti\.•c change in the existing Jaw, .. found on page 94 of the packet. 
Rep. Pignanelli asked how the intent language would be structured He expressed 
concern how the comrnissfon could expre.~ the c]C(.'t.Orates intent. 
Ms. Watts Baskin stated that the House and Senate Journals would reflect the intent of 
the legislature in m~ing the amendment and the voters would know. through the Voter 
lnfonnation Pamphlet. that the intent of the amendmenc was not to change current staturory 
interpretation but merely to remove archaic language from the constitution. 
11le commission voted on the motion which passed unanimously. Sens. Beattie and 
Dmitrich, Justice Durham. Rep. Harward. and Ms. Wood were absent during the vote. 
ThC' ('Ommission 1"('~5s-ed for lum:h. 
S. "Jury Trial Resolution," 1996FL-0689/003, 11-27-95 DRAFT 
"Trial by Jury." l996FL-07611002, 11-29-95 DRAFT-
Chief Justice Micbae] D. Zimmerman, Utah Supreme Court, referred to the Letter on 
page 99 of the packet thac was sent to the commission. When the coon consolidation biU passed 
in 1991. it immediately consolidated the circuit and district courts in districts five through eight, 
he said. He explained that the Utah Constitution requires cight•pcrson juries m the trial cour1 of 
general jurisdiction. regardless of the type of case. Unless there is a change in the constitution, 
coun consolidation will require the trial of Jcsser civil and criminal cafies by an eight-person jury. 
even though historicaUy these types of cases have been tried in the circuit court by a four- or six-
pcrson jury. The consolidated district courts in the Fifth through Eghth Judicial Districts have 
been using eight-person juries since J 992 without undue problcm.'i. Consolidation of rhe courts 
in lhe populous Wasatch Front bas brought with it the need for the same flexibility regarding jury 
size. Thal is the reason for the proposed amendment. he said. The flexibility will allow cost 
·v;) 
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savings by pennittingjuries of less than eight in rural distrk1s where consolidation has already 
occurred. 
Mr. Strong asked if the resolution would be putting in constitution that a capital cac.e jury 
shall consist of twelve. 
Chief Justice Zimmcnnan explained that currently the constitution stale$ that in ,capital 
cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. 
Justice Durham noted that there is some !ederal constitutional doctrine to lhe effect that 
twelve may be required. She said she did not think it had yet been decided. She expressed 
concern shoold the constitutional amendment pa.'iS and not the implementing statute.~. 
Mr. RaJpb Dewsnup, Utah Trial Lawyers Assodation. stated any change of lhe 
constitution which either grants more power to the Legislature or 1akcs some away shou Id be 
closely scrutinized He said anytime there is an amendment. j1 may be considered to amend 
everything that preceded it. both by way of judicial interpretation and the text of the constitution 
itself. There is not, and never has been. a provision in the state constitution that guaranteed the 
right to a civil jury trial. It is an implied right. There are Supreme Court cases that hold that this 
section of the constitution grants the right to a civil jury trial. If the constitution is amemded and 
the Legislature is granted the authority to set the number of jurors. it can be a potential problem 
to allow the Legislature 10 do away with the right to civil trial by specifying that the number of 
jurors in certain trials will be O or 2. He suggested that one way to address lhat potential problem 
is to make explicit in the constitution that there i~ an inviolate right to civil jury trial unle.~ 
wajv~. 
Justice Durham said the language suggested by Mr. Dcwsnup would not fix the problem 
he raised because civil cases generally would apply possibly to adjudication in juvenile court and 
aJso m small claims court. 
Chief Justice Zimmennan stated their express intention is not to change anything and not 
to affect existing case law. If that intent is expressed in the CRC report to the legislature. it may 
address the problem. 
Chair Mc Keachnie pointed out that the commission could put the intent in its report to 
the Legislature and make sure that it is read into the record in the House and Senate Journals and 
could be in the Voter Information PamphleL 
Mt. Sullivan read the Scvenlh Amendment of the United State Constitution. He was not 
sure if that language would solve the problem or not. 
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Justice Durham said that has been constn1ed as a matter of federal law to be extremely 
limited. For any statutory rights created by Congress. it is up to Congress to decide whether they 
go to a jury or to bench trial. 
Mr. Tim Shea, Admlnlstrative Office of the Courts, explained that case law 
developing the right lo a jury trial in civil c~s relies on the waiver provision. A right cannot be 
waived unless it exist.s; therefore. the Supreme Court inferred thal there was a jury right 
established by the original constitution in 1896. The coun relied upon the legislative hi&tOry that 
went into that provision to distinguish between cases of common law and case.sin equity. 
However. none of that is in the constitution itself. It has all been inferred from the last Lwo 
sentences of the constitutional provision which arc lef l undisturbed by the proposed amendment. 
Because che amendments only shift the responsibility for establi'thing the size of juries from the 
constitution to the Legislature. the change to those few sentences would not change the 
jurisprudence that has been built up around the rest of that body of law. 
Ms. Wood asked if it would be acceptable to include a sentence stating that in no event 
will a jury consist of less than four jurors. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman said he did nor think the language suggested by Ms. Wood 
answers Mr. Dewsnup•s c-0ncerns. He said language could be added that the right to civil jury 
shall not be impaired. 
Justice Durham said if Ms. Wood's language were included. it would deal with :\-fr. 
Dewsnup's concern about the Legislature using its power to establish the size of juries which 
sodal fiC'ie~e rese°"h suggests that could not perform any of the traditional functions of a jury. 
Chief Justice Zimmennan said if the commission inserted the language he proposed, it 
would addres..it Mr. Dewsnup•s concern, but is vague enough that it does not forbid the growth of 
alternative dispute resolution, for example. It would be left to the courts to imply as of the date 
of the amendment. 
Mr. James Housley. Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County. indicated that the 
proposal originally repealed and reenacted this section. which be indicated wouJd inadvertently 
uproot an entire universe of jurisprudence that has already been developed around the idea of a 
jury trial in Utah. (n negotiations with the court administrator's office. the court administrator's 
office proposed the alternative cu~nt language. Mr. Housley concurred with the proposal with 
the exception of the word ushaJr' on line 19. He expressed concern that one could argue that 
people arc entitled to a jury trial1' even for petty offenses. Under federal constitutionaJ J.TOVisjons 
there have been a number of cases that have diff crentiated between petty ca1:,C; and seric-us cases. 
he said. The differentiation is basically at six months potential incan:eration but Utah supreme 
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Court cases have discussed the differentiation without actually holding that this is what is 
covered by the state constitution. He said they would like not to be precluded from using the 
federal interpretation. He requested that the use of the word ·•shall" not be intended to change 
the jurisprudence surrounding the right to jury trial. 
Ms. Watts Baskin asked if there wa.~ another reason, olher than the concern for court 
costs. that the change is being proposed. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman said they now feel that they can change certain areas and save 
money whether it is passed or not. He said it is a flexibility issue. In some of the smaller couns. 
it may be harder to physically accommodate eight jurors rather than four, he said. 
Justice Durham indicated the Judicial Council's motivation in proposing the amendment 
was to maintain the operational status quo under the constitution. 
Mr. Sullivan asked if there was a difference between something being inviolate 3J1d 
something being impaired. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman said he did not think it would make any difference. He felt 
legislative history is more important than the prcci~ word chosen when the coon is making an 
interpretation of the issue~ 
Ms. Wood seated that the language proposed by Chief Justice Zimmerman may have the 
opposite effect of what is intended by limiting legislative authority. 
MOTION: Mr. Sullivan moved to adopt proposed legislation. "Jury Trial Resolution," 
dated 12-7-95 along with the legislative history discussion and with the following amendmenc 
Line 19: after "statute" insen •·• but in no event shall a iury consist of fewer than 
four persons" 
Ms. Wood indicated thal the proposed language parallels and preserves the cunent 
constitutional provision. Currently in courts of inferior jurisdictions, it is four jurors. 
The commission voted on the motion which pa.~ unanimously. Sens. Beattie, 
Dmitrich. and Hill)·ard and Reps. Harward and P1gnanelli were ~nt during the vote. 
Justice Durham urged that the commission's minutes include a reference to the fact that 
the commission no more means to impair the right to stipulate to a jury smaJlcr than four than the 
current constitution prevents someone from stipulating to a jury smaller than eight. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). If you wlll permit me_l know that you want to get it right. 
The substitute which I offer provides that a jury shall be waived in civil cases, 
if not demanded, as the Legislature might provide. That makes a provision 
that unless a jury is demanded it is waived. That system is in effect now in 
New York, Michigan, and Tennessee, and in quite a number of other states, 
and I intend to speak about that. It is adopted in those states and the people 
are trying a vast number of cases before the courts, without resorting to the 
jury at all. 
Mr. EICH NOR. I will read it again: "The right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, but in civil actions the jury shall consist of nine in district courts, and 
in inferior courts of six, or less, as the Legislature may provide; a verdict in 
such cases, may be rendered by concurrence by two-thirds of the jurors. A 
jury may be waived in civil cases and in misdemeanors by consent of both 
parties, expressed in open court." That fixes it in the bill of rights. We know 
exactly what we have. We know exactly what we present to the people; there 
can be no misgivings in the minds of the people when we present the 
Constitution for their adoption or rejection. 
"In civil actions or misdemeanors the jury may consist of any number, less 
than the number fixed in this section." I think that comes right down to the root 
of all this argument. Let us fix it in the bill of rights and fix it such a way that a 
Legislature in simple aberration of the mind will not endanger the jury system. 
I believe we ought to show something for our work, ought to show something 
for the time we are consuming here. Fix it right in the bill of rights, and we 
know what we have and no one can take it from us. All this talk about bulwark 
of liberty_what will be the bulwark of liberty in in Utah? The bill of rights will be 
the main spring of the liberty of this State, and I hope that every amendment 
will be voted down, and when the time comes I shall introduce this. 
Mr. BOWDLE. The bill, as amended by Mr. Van Horne, does not meet my 
approbation. Neither does the one that was introduced by the gentleman from 
Weber. There is one trouble with the amendment as I see it introduced by Mr. 
Evans, that is this: It provides that in offenses less than a felony a person may 
be tried by a jury of less than twelve; the argument that the gentleman has 
made against a jury of twelve is broken in my opinion by his concession that in 
all criminal cases it shall be twelve. If it shall be twelve in all criminal cases of 
felony, why, if nine is so good, if nine be such an admirable jury, or any jury 
less then nine be such a great institution, why does he concede that when we 
come to try a man for his life, it shall be twelve. The very admission is that a 
jury of twelve is better than nine. He admits it when he makes that argument. 
I. claim that a man's liberty is not in jeopardy only when the doors of the 
penitentiary may stand before him, or when his life is at stake. His reputation 
might be just as sacred, or more sacred than his life. I believe that when a 
man is on trial for any crime he should have a fair and impartial {292} trial by a 
jury, as the gentleman concedes the best jury, that is a jury of twelve, and for 
that reason I am not in favor of that amendment. I am not in favor of a sliding 
jury system. I believe we ought to know what kind of a jury we are going to 
have. If we are going to have a jury of twelve men, let us have a jury of twelve, 
and not leave it to the Legislature. If we are going to have a jury of nine, let us 
say so, and not have a jury this year of nine, and the next Legislature that 
meets thinks that is not quite good enough and they make a change, saying 
we have a jury of twelve. We have a jury of twelve for two years. The next 
Legislature comes along and says that it is too much expense, let us cut it 
down to eight, or six, or five. People rebel against it and you keep going 
back, and from that one thing to the other all the time, and you do not know 
where you are. Gentlemen, let me ask you this question. Solve it each one for 
yourself; if you had grave property interests at stake would you prefer to have 
a jury of eight, a jury of twelve, or a jury of four? On general principles, 
everything else being equal, there is not a man in this house, I do not believe, 
even the gentleman that has argued that the jury system should be cut down, 
but would say I will take the largest number you give me. Why? Because he 
feels that in that his interests are more nearly protected than in the smaller 
number. He feels that the opportunities for the other side to come around and 
work the jury, are not so good. Therefore, I am not in favor of cutting the jury 
down to a smaller number. 
I can see my way to vote for a jury of nine, but as I now see it, I cannot 
consent to vote to give it into the hands of the Legislature, to make it any 
number less than that. Nor, am I in favor of referring it to them to fix any 
number. 
I say let us fix it here now and settle that matter. Why, says the gentleman, we 
are progressing. Yes, it has taken 
five hundred years to come from a jury of twelve down to have this 
Convention say that a jury of nine will do. If it takes five hundred years to 
come from the idea of twelve down to nine, I think we can safely fix it at nine 
and rest easy there for a time at least. We are not going to grow so rapidly at 
that ratio, that we will need to have a jury of five or six in the age of the 
gentleman that has just been speaking. One thing further on that same thing. 
It is said that it is a great saving of expense_a great saving of expense. The 
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Proposition 
No. 3 
JURY TRIAL RESOLUTION 
Votes cast by the members of the Legislature at the 
1996 General Session on final passage: 
HOUSE (75 members): Yeas, 69; Nays, 3; Absent, 3. 
SENATE (29 members): Yeas, 28; Nays, I; Absen1, 0. 
Official Ballot Title: 
Shall the Utah Constitution be amended to modify the 
provisions on jury size for certain types of court cases 
so that: (a) juries in capital cases must consist of twelve 
persons, (b)juries in all other felony cases must consist 
of al least eight. and (c) juries in other cases must have 
their sizes established by the Legislature, but in no 
event can a jury be less than four? 
Impartial Analysis 
Proposal 
Proposition 3 amends the present provisions in the Utah 
Constitution which establish jury sizes based upon which 
courr hears the case and instead provides for jury size to be es-
tablished based upon which type of case the court hears. The 
proposal also imposes a restriction on the Legislature that in 
no event shall a jury consist of less than four persons. 
Jury Sizes and Proposed Constitutional Changes 
The Legislature and the Judiciary have consolidated the 
circuit courts into the district courts, eliminating the circuit 
courts. This change means that circuit courts, courts of inferi-
or jurisdiction which heard less complicated and less serious 
civil and criminal ma11ers. no longer exist, and district courts. 
courts of general jurisdiction. try the types of cases the circuit 
cour1s previously handled while retaining their own caseload 
as district courts. Courts of general jurisdiction, district 
courts. are presently required by Article I, Section 10 to have 
an eight member jury in all cases, except in capital cases which 
require twelve jurors. 
Under this proposal. all cases that were tried at the circuit 
court with a four member jury, such as Class 8 and C misde-
meanor trials. would still be tried with a four member jury in 
the consolidated district courl. Similarly, all cases that were 
tried at the circuit court with a six member jury, such as Class 
A misdemeanor trials. would still be tried with a six member 
jury in the consolidated district court. Felony cases currently 
tried hy an eight member jury or capital cases currently tried 
27 
by a twelve member jury in the district court would still be 
tried by the same size juries in the consoliduted district court. 
Unless there is a change in the Utah Constitution. the 
present constitutional language will require the trial of lesser 
civil and criminal cases by an eight member jury in the consol-
idated district courts, even though these types of cases histori-
cally have been tried in the circuit court by a four or six mem-
ber jury. 
Legislation Effective on Passage of Proposition 3 
S.8. 53, Trial by Jury, 1996 General Session. will become 
law on January I. 1997 only if Proposition 3 is approved. The 
bill retains language on capital and felony case size juries. re-
tains the denial of jury trials in small claims cases, :.ind retains 
the right of parties 10 agree 10 a lesser-sized jury in all cases 
except capital cases. S.B. 53 changes jury sizes in other types 
of cuses in the district court. designates that a verdict must be 
unanimous in criminal cases and not less than three-fourths of 
the jurors in civil cases, and repeals the language specifying 
jury sizes in justice court cases. The bill eliminates juries in 
juvenile court in the adjudications of minors charged with 
what would constitute a crime if commillcd by an adult. 
Effective Date 
Proposition 3 takes effect January I. 1997. 
Fiscal Impact 
Proposition 3 should result in reduced jury costs. 
l l-27-95 DRAFT 1996F L-0689/003 
JURY TRIAL RESOLUTION 
2 l 996 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 A JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE LEOISLA ruRE PROPOSING TO AMEND THE UT AH 
5 CONSTITIJTION; AMENDING THE PROVISIONS ON TRIAL BY JllRY; PRESERVING 
6 THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES; REPEALING THE 
7 REQlJIREMENT OF EIGHT-PERSON JURIES IN GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS; 
8 AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DA TE. 
9 This resolution proposes to change the Utah Constitution as follows: 
·v;> IO RtPeM~ kNf> ltcENAC f s:· . .:f1J"f: :1,,. i) :; ; 
11 ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 
12 Be ii re.folved by the LegislaJure of the stale of Ulah, two-thirds of all members ekctrd to each 
13 
14 
JS 
16 
17 
18 
of the two houses voting infavor th£reof l 
~1,f-Ultc_., 
Section 1. lt is proposed to repea and reenad Artic1e I. Section 1 o. Utah Cons!itution, to 
read: 
Art~I, Section 10. (Trial by jary.J ~-----
f!arties have-lb$ riiJ,t to trial by jury in an,y crimjnal s:,a in which the h~Ki:.Iature has 
...... 
established a term ofincarceiMio,n as a p<>Miblc; seotence, The riaht to trial by iYO' in ciyjl cases 
19 is preseryed. A iuzy in a civil case is wiJhie9 unless demanded, The verdict in a criminal ca.'iC shall 
-~. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
he unanimous The verdict in a civil case shall l»bzoot less than three-fourths of the jurors, A 
trial bro: shall coosist of twelve peaom io a CHPiJal cast,, ~"llislnlure shall have lhc power 
Jo implerumt the provisions of this section. , 
/ -~ Section 2. Submittal to eltctors. \ 
24 Jbe lieutenant ~vernm: is directed to submit this pmposed amendment to the electors of 
25 the state oft Jtah at the next ""eraJ election in the manner provided by law! 
26 Section 3. Effective date. 
27 If approved by the electors of the state, the amendment pmposed by this joint resolution 
28 shall take effect on JammO' I, t 997. 
Itu.'11 I Film In nl!J 
ilu!!t £3filin r. 
m'inmJ. 
~eit1t.e,tu!fi" t-r1 4~te,~-inttrrH~ 1ua.t] i tnpu:r;t): f]trn f)tu11f=1bmct0;l'. t,;.:N~.:i 
&-cri lw.id, 
f -Ul70 I. i:t':tt-r• ,v h1?aever in dtLH (:oda- the puni~hmuP.nt .fori 
n. 1'rtrntJ: t~: 1.12ft tn~d~tcrun i ned bclw11en oortJ1ia limi~1 th•e 1m.n-
i:i·tm:1i1_!ntt. t-=-~ lw itJdhct ... ·•d , n1 tt 1~irti-1•.uhhr {!I!~~ mm~t: be -rh~1.~r-
r111 ilb(Hl hy t.lH~ F.!Ctitlft 11utl~Ol'tZ•~d to Pri-"~ ~ .. ~tlt.tl~lfj['.~'!g ;\v,itbi1, ~(~_{!It 
Hmiht tu+-rmay hn pr4•;~:e:rib-e,d ft)Jl llll1i ➔ Codt:J~ 
l/fil1.iuU! lt"nll- i 4;i1L, •;l~t¥) trb~ \'UrficHta iit:-CHtH1m ttf lillri Corle wbicln 
ltlftii~ Ultly ht! , ~ ' * I ·. , 
rtt:u:t u1~u1a:~, rl&J.!dRJro 1 ht,1 ~"' ultt.!n(1C vhtm aed upiJ a the e:~gmonn.tlon oft & t,1m uu t:-t:1,)fHi- , . . . 
,:,•:;~u teat r,c.r. lJT-t!-♦ ~{ltl J{i;f. W wH tit•..,~ r,•tUJ1 tl~H. be rtt•(!r_r+r(tdl ~gninf:.t bim a~ nay 
<!rd rniiuu:R pir~~c-ee.;ian_g;~1 dlo JHlt fo1·hii1l ~•,db ~vjd~nti1~ . .,Jt btJiu~ JiTo'l'tndl 
~iti met tHll(~h a)er1-tofll !fll{pon any prll<!~)t:\111hag~ fn-u,~t11!·1d Ht'li•1~1 ~ 
ebti r~,l!: of JJ111rd;rnry t~t!IIlHfU it.tfDa:H i u Hneb exan11uw1.tion., 
r•..-1, t ~ 1t-WlJl. flt<fJ;, .A cdnrt:f!~ or r1irnblfo nffenci~ i.~ lil.ll tL•Jt com ... 
"l;l':,:r;i;ar qm I _ . ,i· _ . 
~~
1;,t'h,mm nuitt.t'il or 01~dth1.d h1 Vtnh,tlr!)PJ iff,f' u UH!~1 forbiddtrng.or ffiEll-
lfliJUlding llg un11l ll1l 'A'hir1b iltl,thl!U'J~Xerl 1 tutir{1~n ti!n~t'ia:tiotl, u1d~H~r 
of Ulie :fu1lo1Nit1g pu.niehlllLenb~: 
·a • n(,lbg ha 
~, J.m pri~.:ttltlD~ldJJ. 
a; FnnttL. 
-:I " H tam n v nl -f rro rn a flt r:e :t o tr., 
(, I DttF.lilfl~ltJttfiir.mtaol'l to ht,ldl .u tld l~lljoy ~ny orn.c~ n.f lqOJ1•f)f; 11 
trn~l or prn Int in r l.Jjp; Ttl!rroa ory L 
i .i:, ,f ~. 'IM I C tf m1J~:d, mn• di vkh'14.) H!llt.o ; 
l 1 1-t··'tbtnni~u,; m.1~d1 
2. :\l hulem~~HH.H"tt L 
~~t~~.~,ru~ i :Ja~u • 11~t4) A ft· lo:rl)" is lfl crim~ \\1 hfob itt,e (Ht t191~Y bq! 
H•J~~QlilP,nf,lf; T -
iJuiJoarL IJ-UIDG~ brnlJhJ 'it''i1 h di:.·1nn ~. ~ or by hn ()rtt-hJillJ[lf.!:flt fin the per:ut~ntiili ry -
E1i•4• nt otl wr ~ti tJbn h1 tii onL~11eme~;41u)t a 
• 
. t;rnl;$ ff~' ril ·~ -1.i~ij l • \tmH Exe~pt in (Hl~f!H 1t\1l~t?fit~ Jl tfifhHrt~na punlitih-
1 .J; rr~iHr&.!i _ • b ..t b _ l . : .. l 
,r t•"IJ unt flti1to.t 36 pt'(~~It'fl 4!1.Ji y t Jl}3 Lot •I?:~ ~:'!i'ery off entt?e 4·h:tc::H1~tal!(ll to btt 
1•thur'1!.'.':1.u· 1,rr · . , . . ,. r 1 1 
!Hrt!,..~,J. ~ ft• lony ]F-i raruu~lm bJ..., b~- uu JJrt~fJJiiEllflIJI Lfl ~.he pem1.tHJiilLiu.tJ' ,~r•f 
Pun·imli±.1.:oot uf 
hit1nt.,;m,11.:n~•f 
e xe cJ.N.U n ~ fi 't; t1 .)' -•.;,:11.r~ , 
i 4;\f-1'2 ... ,;1i?t1:1 ExL~Jlf ir:1 rnt:1(~:4 ·,i,tierc~ u diff or~nt JJtaui·ah-
__ ...,., ~ ...... .; ......... ;h,n,•l: & •• ,., ll·,:., d , ..... t ... . ·.1r.tn;i1.i1 .. .,H.~••••-• ..J., .. ]_..., •.. l t- 1--
CHAt1TEU [1. 
Sa1no~. SEL',.Hl!°4 ~ 
:ifflH w·hem tr.wJ by ja1ey dc~0d t<) ,5;32-t \\"'ho bn1ut eoma~tNQt to net rut 
b~ W.td~ittd. t ti fQ r .. 
rn811) Jn.ry to ~o.raStst of ht•W lJt1lDY 032-"'• \\"bo b~ exemt,a from UnbUity tu 
pi!flJotJ!:l. ~t- ti.s jttrur. 
~~() C~nttt mny i,rsue1 1tt4!'utre., 532b PcrtSott <J~tmpt mnyIM:rrve 11 w.bum. 
~ l !tU'Qf.'4 may l:N!. tiutin.monlild .onUy -a~i" \V h-t.."u J nror ca1n ,~e e'.1'(rnlified .. 
tt.322 Offlter mn~t tretm'U \"fitllft tu o~lB W h~1t pt:1'fMJiM' ~Xtt!mpt 8JlttfSt, 
court wil h e.odQffl(11n~u1t, 5tatt• utu:h·r ootlt. 
~l~-3 Juro_n, tiUl.J oo smiuuooed from .6n!!9 ChnU,.~gt" t,Q jurors. 
nny p,nrt of 1ucort11u~tt~ dry~ 
1:. 5:-\1l~-~ s lt•. A trial by J·•u .. ,.♦ ~hull be d+J~tned to be w~e:n irln.t bJ 
• )I ., .. "' . }nry -~tM't'l! 
,vru, ... eA unless a JUt1t be dt,rnnnde◄ I by the defendmt. If be la IUt?J wB1v~~tL 
~ ~ 
d~n1aud-a jury, it i:lludl be for~n~J in tht.1 uu1:nner ptovudcd i.n 
this Chuptera 
§ a3lit s 17. Th~ jniry in =~ ~rhniimaJ ,~~ tried before JIDey~t't;JltJ• 
,. ., f h .. _ •1 ~ . f . " I · .. . h _nbat or oix )V6tt~ n Justice o t . ~ pence:1 s:alillil e,~on81!ilt o. ~-DX p~rsons uav1ng t e ,;_~~u., . ·· ,, Qo~ca1nfit:.1Ai 
f ,,llowing qunJHicut.ioll8 ! of .. 
L They ~hnU be nmle t:uti:t<H'.Lt5 of the [lnited 8tib~rJ over 
... 
the u.g•~ of t.wonty-onlt yeur,;; :uad 
t ~ Ahle t.o n~ad and write the Englis.b ltanguage; and 
.. 
dint11 ttot ffj{Ct:!~!d~ng ona l hotG~-!atld doUnir-~ nntl imprteo11tt11et1t hn 
Hu~ 001.nny jfti L not 1P.-Xtlilfi1din_g oth~~ JH~r. 
§ .t...'1)1t-fl. (f:,a:i;;·, Evory 0~e1!:Ut.i V(! odfker who ~b or Edn•rtlOOJ. 
r{•it:,J:•ivt1~ tlny emoh.ament, ~r.uJuil.j' II or rewnrd" or t1ny piromb~e. 
c hun~u.f\ JJlX:(!t~pd ;ng .H:1nd1 ttff trnrny h1, ,u.H,b nri 2.L1.d. by ln'i\' u for 
doing attiy offli_d,11 aif!.t" i~ ,guilty of Lt} 1bbi~.dt• m~.•au,oir. 
§ 431~~)" ~~Faitd f:,l •~r ,,· person who 'it· it h itntf!ntt t-0 defrn.ud" :r1d1JdrJ?t~0Jt1y· 
< I • iPft'i-1ClJtJh{;f 
pre.~,rrotJJ for· rt]hnArtUlt,1(~ or for 1-.a\''lll'! ni to :ttfll,'ll tt!ount.,..,- <mturt, ~lha iu1 d11lmJtJ 
rt· Q J tu ~h: vffi; 
auditor of p·tn.bliie, ttacJeo1.u~tH-, d h' tm1uu~i], or oth4~l' otititt-r au- (mn_ t(•t- pth;rtJr. 
' . ~I,} flf [;JI)'• 
thorized to uJlow ot ;Jtty tbe snme if @:JJ:tnnlnir; .. JbUJ' f~L1.1fl! or mr-ut. -
f lf-audrnle L1t cltth11" btl1, JI t:!e11-)UtLt" 1·oucihc-r" or ttttrfti.ttg, bM gudJty 
of ta n1ifKfieanaanora 
4- -·l,M)O~ U~) EvijttJl J,J~!r~ou w bo gjvae nr o«~m uny 11I11,-t1J.Q" n 
,1·utu L~y Or' lf'~waru. in l;!t)U~id~ 1•1~Hm1 tlbmt he illlI' l'il:r,¥ otJler l:t.ef~ ~~?'11~ti ti' 
Hili'l ~hiit.1 l lbl~ npf )Diid (Id to llin.r JMlihl ic offic.;_1 o or f9rutU bu per-
t11 I t.t.•Jd 'tt1 oxercise 01r dnettdlMttg~ tin~ duaie~ therri.!t1f, iH- gtttUty ot 
u m h~ah)tuit.c,..u.nor .. 
I 44-1_~ Q ~ 1 ,~il'-1 n.~,rer~f ipul~Dk, ofti4!(•l". who, t'or mn:r r.tmt1.dt:v 1:~klt.14l ttt· 
... t;I. . . . . • . .. • ,t: 5J ., ~TdD- fut 
nt t'FJWltitJ ~ Ug)JJOIHltH !Utat.ln!f l-•~1'1f401!t til) jl fHlhhc offit"4! fl or l1'lfilla 110,~mJIOOl, 
~nt~ 1.unvt.hll!r Jt1H·wou to t~Xt!rchm rnr (B1S4~hP!t'ge E'iflJ' of the dut.ic.a 
of hiY o:flit'it" fa. pq
1
~3tbd1ah le by B lHHit!i 11.ot aJ}UJt;.101Hug ons thous~ 
tUJd du11Hr~" 
§ 4.10:t ll :; IK'i'it' 1~ V{lf\' 1·t+P.raon who \tl I run 't' tUJd k.nowinal, .. ltuurrutLnR 
. _ . L' . . /ii . f., ,/ fn !.1511Jf'K:J1 t1 f 
j ntll'Ud!IJ'!lf, bi IUE'll!' l r i tlli[IJ r~t'I y 1m h 1i t• 0 llfit•.(! t O w· ijp D r•h b ·~ hilliti inot ~~ w I'll illf 
be'f!n l!'Be,Jtt&d or rnpp4..1intr:+d 1 ~ut•·l rt1Y0r.:,t pei'-90ll who, BHt\' tttig lJ(~Ht 
rtu1 L~X~!tt,1/u.lth'e o tlieor, wilfully ~~Xl:Jrt~L-..e.+ any n f ~.lhtl fHD(lt1ontl 
of lri:1 offfoc 11tte r hifl 1 ~·nn htS11 t! x.pi red 1uul at [!.Ui!.!t)1;t4t+-t1r hu1t; 
h('f! fl Q,d:t_i.t ... t;j}d or Hlfl]MliBUt~tlii ~nlfi b~.:fl (ijUttlifi~d p is guHGy U f 13 
1:1'1 i.~ilt.,PH~-~•Ut(tf -t 
·i .. t .jfl!t I rnn(I r:very o-ffic~.~r w h u~,~ 0Uie1~ ia ttboHahl1'd by [j11Fi:Jrnt: fo 
I, 1._ -11 · h. " ' u l - 1t. Ii .. IL n. ,a,, rflrn•forr 11~,\-. or woo, nnt•~r l. J!i oxpurinlH)ttl Ot t 11} tau~e 11or Yt·.1uc.u ufil tK.lltm~ 1Jtr~~ 11'.'P 
• - t·· d. . r- fl . . .. 1 :i lll!rlUL'fi~o-~,.. n uty b<! uIppou1 t4!ttl Ol' e l,ut e .q or n. hn· h1H apihr. r•~,!lsgner 01r ioee111t 
h.•gtdly rc-nnnv~d Jfrou1 otfflee .. ivfnfuU~" or u u lnwUuUy v,dtthboltl!~ 
r1ir d1Jt.uin~ 'f rnni hit: ~~t)1:~:1f;or o l' other R>•Jf':slO n e1~tttlNl thero.to 
, 7 l 
,r 
I 
I 11y_ 
f• q IHI~ 
I' I ~ . u, ' I "I I~' 
1
,d1;f1 \ ilfulh . ri' ~ t 
1l1L1 if i ,.~lm,· r•i or n1 1111q tt 111 
t~ \ ill'.~ I ''l hli•• rilli~111· 1r\ ln1 .. 
,. •11 hc 111t ti ' I 
• H 11 I ' f I 1- •·d J I_. 
I 1t1fi i •d11 1 I Li; I tiu I ' I .. UI• 11 · .1 ·•11 Ill~ 
' 
, Jni 1111•11I i 
•l U I 111~ IH~ IJd 
11 l d 1 ' · t ··•l•J11 
11 n dti1 ,., d1~ 
I I Jil> I • 111 uud 
11,,U, t • ,f 1' " , ,11 , • ~ l lll l lrtA~Jlllll\' Hf l rt 1 II 1J' 1'11 I ) j • • I HI C ll;ii 1' 1 din, 
• \ '!I I' • 
111!1 1 I' Il l'!' 
I I I' 
i•rt:~ilr I )1HI I IU) 
~d 1 
., LI ,~ I, 4"!11 
' 
1111r ,·n 111 i rrn l 1•ilt' JM ~ 
If 
tt 11 .. h ll1 1 ff. 1l~1 •11l \ 
j II i 1•11 4, l In• , 1 4 1 · , " , t h 1 • 1"" 
1i1 i rJ lt a ► r ~ll"'11Jl'I', i ~111 o i4lrtth l 
11 tl ,I , 1, .1l1H . 
~·1 11 1•,•, I , ,Jie ur 
I I ( tf I I J'I 
,111 1ing' I, 
f I I HJ Ill_\ ' 
1,,., ,,. 111 i11u h, c •11 11 ,n· 1-u 1 .,, 
, u •p l , ,, Hll' ,ci ti 1• fl l' "· i,l.,• tl f·, ~1 hv 11 1,\ , ~,1 ,,., hi1•h t1 d mc i1H," 
for nht tmnding or a~,pting u challenge to fight it dm;,I, or J•tlrniohmtt11t 
· . . . .. tcw tieutlt~ ~, 
,Yho u~e$ iny r~pronchfnl tu•· ·cou.t4!ttnpht(.nut 1'u1gnmge, varbal, :ffl&~llfw-
writt011 or printti.:I. to or tt,tJut.1iuriu1g another for not tending ::~',:r'::~. 
or t11cc;.epting ui chnllcng~ to tight a duel, or wiU1 int.t!ui tn piroaa :if,{:,~1::tii 
,,ok•.9 u duet. us ~uilty of 111 rnis(lemetan<H'. 
§ 4ti79. <l!lt4I) ~;verv J·ud,n10., justit1e of the 1>et,t~, 1-lheritl\ Ointt-NJ.ot Gtffl. 
• . e • · oom w, ,re-
o r other oflicer b<,und to pr~e1·ve the pub he peiu.~o, who hstt ",.1 rllinmtl'la 
knowledgtl of t.lHl h1tcntiou on the ptrLrt of nny pert":Jons lo figlit 
" du('), and w.ho doej not ox-.n:t hh~ official sul1H)rity t<P t'1're~t 
the i~11ty r.1udl r,re,tGnt tho dutil, i~ 1n1uim:rntb\o by thic not axD 
<~1.~e4Hug fhio htsndretd dollnWJ. 
§ 44-80. oooin No p0rsoo •ball be cxcut:1ed frorn testifying ,,,~fl.~1 
" . · ! . . ,. . 1t . t . . . ri ! f 1,rivh~. 
or anaweiruig any quegt,on upon ,,ny n1v0tat1gmt1on -or t r:ti · or 
H ,·iolation of either of the pro, .. hr1ion1 of this Ch1pter, upon 
Ui~ grotu1d t.bat hiij t.eJJtitnony might tend t-0 cauvi43t him of a 
4~rimt~. :But no e,Tiden~;e given upon JAny exiamination of a 
1 pcrs,o n NO testifying 8luu.J ba, retmivad atgai nJrti hiru in any 
(lriminal prooet--utit,:n or pro,ceading, 
r 
E. ' • 
,p l l 
A ~null ll~,. 
I I ,1, , f 11:H~ ,. flt• i,J 1\ J1 liS ntdt, i-1 JU1 L1Jl lit~\•f1tl nH, 111< pf . r•(olpl,•~1 
\' ith 11 Jt'• ,u !dJiHt.f . ~, 1•<11 1111 i t .1 \"i•1I ·r1i iu." 111_, ~" ihtj 
111 n.f1tr1 11 1,s1t1lfwr:-. 
1 I :-, I , o: 1•11 • \ r, i,1 
, 1 J ll ~ 
1 1111. \ ', i If ii n , ol u11I· ,, i'ul 
t t r I' \•i 1il e3 111 'f' I 11nn I ]1 , 
/._ 11~,~ I ,•1·_1iY i I 1111i Utt Id h_11 , , ti 111 io tu 
HU• I I . 
thr ,•0~1t1 l t j HI uuL 1· 
~ 1 I Ki • tl"ID 
pli I' I 
1L11,,1 , 1•t! d,dl:11· . 11 h,.r h,apti (1r.11n ,, 11 1 i11 
r11 t,nU1 ~ 1• r 11 ~ l11 ,t 11. 1 
,N u ,,,  i 1 l'ttll_,, ,, tLil 11mli, •t1111 Ed f 
p• I l >H 1 ,f ~tu, t 1'0f'J1(1 i,·,~ nerd• 01' I'• fl, tic, 
,·h,mi 111 ,,f 11 11 ,\1 11 11 f 111'f•. ,\0 t1h 1'1, i ,1bt11• t I ir1ju11• 1l1r.• fl I or 
~H ti •ll l'• tl 11 • h,,11 1 I ,r u,•11 1,, f" tq j l lt UL1j lr bl~, I I, i JLl lJI Uolrw 
rna11f~ 1 wn r a11y 'Wl 11r·11~ 11 1t 1,o r11 11 r 1m ,, , n,1 11 111µ; u 11u1, 1•rr.• 
hou ~hl . ,~1r1. 11 >J ·d ~ d l':i t tl . 11r 1J'i \11 ·1 1 ti',', t)' , or \.\l . 11 111r, li 1 
! 
:111; li ,·l,1·1 or !(tillli ;u.,. or dir~,fl l,· 1)r11,d it ,11·lb I t•f~ 'l\, .. 1ttt-
mi i, 111 I 1•,, to or f', r h · pn ') 1 , ,. , , , , it 11 ,• lJ'pt I q , t,•11 ,H11g 
!Ill_, !'il l ·h •·"'··· 11 ,, l 1•1 11• 1tl ~ ··Jt 1 , . , nd~•. ! l tr ,r. 11 I lli"f • i 1· i'l '] ~ 
r • 1•n lttfo11 1 i ~klilt .r 11{ 11 lf~i ,Lr-111r·:1i•Hr. 
h.11,1 , , ., ( 1;,11, t 1 1' i,.,,, .r: 11t'OJ1 "'11,, k ,·p hf)••11 ,,n , ' ,ru l1 • 
{'I I',- • ( ,[ 'l, I ~ • 
1 1••11>1 ii.fill 11 11 .. \ ' 1'!1' l' • \H1o1·], ;,1 l~op, h , 11 1 .. 1 luli! W~ 1, 11ll"iJP I O l•" • 11 nHtt• I 11 
;1111 ·•· (l,f° l 1L1 i 1 \ 1-1~ fol Hu p11 r110 t' 11 l,i tr1ot 
1b~,11·1H ... 111~1111 111h l I.JI,' nw• ll I h,Mi! l lm11 1n·e f101' 11 1, 11 l ih:u a 
11111• hu1il l r,•41 , 1 lln · 
( ,I;, I IL ' 1 >t1' 'b"lit1 1 n·h\ i t,11, .. r r I h11 
de, nvl q Jd,' Ir) 111• 1 il 11 ,h,,~ 1~11 ._ow •.>~ 
h(H din • ho 1 1• • i11a1 l1 _ L 1· l 1rn ill 1 , .1 \' •Tfl 
.. r, ,·I lo i t 
h,•• , •a ➔ ,  
lf1:-,· n· l :11\ I, , ~ 
\ · 11 , • •• 11~,1 :-:t; 1•1 r,T Ht: ' "'' 'llH: m :.\LU , ,w TIi i' UF,'\JI. 
1, 1 r t tu il dru$t Htn1•,•., for tiw lt>:::itirnlli 1111 ... irstl'"". c,r ,,M:li . fll' 
~ur'h 11w11ufncl n i1w •~tnt.. l1-- lnn nr, ;l:- ,ll • ,1 .. uul!y .. , ... pt i11 ,·on-
tiuued 1lp N•C io11. 
J~•l"i. P1~~ 1 l·.,•et)- I' r on \\lw ¥-iJfoll.v Ji ... turb"' •>rn,.i111uin,z11,. 
- hg-1 Ut I" -. .. 
di=r111i~t" !tuy :i,. .. ,•mhltt!!f' of JH•opl.• , 111 •f for rdigi 11 \\Or-.bit•, 1hit 
by littlti•• . p1·ofm1 • rli,.,•,>ru•,-(_,• n1d,,, f,1· h•il~t·"'ir1t lwhHvi,11, 111' 
by ,Hl_\' tlW.H ., ...... ,~ry 11 ,i,c. •·ith ·r ,\ilhiu 1tw l)MCF! wh,•l"P ~w·h 
r11cet h.1,?,. j ... lwld, or 4 1) wiar it :t"' lo oi ... llu th o rJ•: l .iurl 
3olenu1 i1 y ,tf I h; 11we1 iug. j .. !!Uilt~ of n mi!'--d 1•1h~.i1101 • 
§ 1.·i1h. •• 1 F ·: ,•n· I' 1~•,o \•,b,., ~(•11 ... orfurru,._1.i.,.~ .rny:<.:i.Je 111,111(•,. 
' l!Llll• 11; · M•l 
mu.It, ,-inou,-? or '1l)triu1out1 littHI 11.. l u :un· 11 •r--on in I he 11t1 1 li~ 1•u 1 11r•••i: 
' J - ~ltlMl I" •e.ll 
loriurn r I hltit•-; c, f nr,r illl':in·e . rn,-1,)det Jt. ma~4·ttm. cir«·n . th~ 1 1. 
• m c--.ir:.nm . 0 1 111:t•''' \\her · 1U) fan'1•, rom.P.J.,. q·:.gi•d.,. lmllc· 1 
O}lt!t'tL or pin~,• f lwi11!! rerforn1ed, nr ~u.,· e \hibitw u nt dant:-
in~. jurrgfi11~ . l\:t., -i, ork ti!.!ur,, nnd ht.> like i-. beit1!! ~ 'Nl 
f, >r pnhHc amui,1•m nt. untl r-n ·r,.v pt•t ou \\ ho cm ph>y ... or p1·0-
cure.: . o r L'tLlt-.h; lo h employ •d or tirt'} ·ut~,1. twy per,on tu 
-.ell or furui , l, :rn~· 111:1 n. \· iunll"', dr ,piriwm, .. li,Jtuir ... ar .. ut•l1 
11lucf,. i_.. !!ni llY of u mi::dem 0 :1uor. ,.. . 
'- Lil!l . m.i~ Ev If per-.1111 \\l1, J)••rfunn. ;u1., unncrc~- 1',nvrmlm: 
l IUI II !!C' • SIU")" ~nr,• h1b1Jr. or do"" 1,n,• 1111u~ ••·i..;uT )W<_lll~:-, on ~ uotla,·, 1~ 1,ti(Jr »n un 
:?ui.ttr 1>( a uli:1fcmt•1w~r, 11 11d fiull ·h • lirwtl in u.u; i.am· no1 411' · 
,, •,q•-~li111r t,, C'lll) - b\' <l'">IJH r~ . 
§ 1.,tu. <1 l Lnhor "mployt·,i hy P.111 11l0:n•-.. 
II -•- - _____ .._: _. _ 
_ t 
~ U •h. h ,;1 dl11.g I'!(, 
_ _ • • U.,.m «1oc- J)()J 
i 
\'1f ' lA "" lil l r:: II Lh 1 1.~ l'i.CJ ' ~ ... ' r 11 ... n,11 "1 '' ril tl \l JI , 11 r1n 1ri 
~uJi11•"". j i, nn1 iu ·hu ll-' rl i 1 I ~{1 h 11'0t> gom 1 1 I 4·1.rvu. 
§ 4,1:i l. 1 J F<tl' 11 1~• 1,11 1 11 1. ·~,~ ,I hi :.11•1. f'-.tn Lt ., 
rf'I ,m In "'n1)ll n( mi~) UI!.! I,. ~:lh~•·tht \' 111h] f. n ui m, I ' n, 1 
. 
u1id.11 i1rht.. 
\w,,: , tv, 1· .. 11•·1· • 11 \',-.1 1111 ,.r, 
r ol h,1 1· N>nU•in m· 
I l, ''\' ii 1 t!i l!ifH' it,µ 11( ; H1Y •.vil, '• llf 
liq11~ 1•·..'." '1 l'. L' , u_v drirnk 1,f wl ,~~·ri wia 
li ,p111,r f ,11·11 n p:nt c r 1r,r s, lliu ,, nr 1n lh rwi 1 
J! I S l i.i ·l · t 1[ r. 11 1T hn itt i •. 1 I' ,,,•hit llr·1l(il~ • ir 
D:JJ) ' I b dduk r~ ,· tirfl l·I~,. w i1lri11 Ul l( 1 I il l' er r1n_y t.:Dlll p OJ 
fl [ ,I m•• I ir ~ l '-'" l Ji.,j ,u. t\'t•l\ hip , d11rit, ,, 1h l,iUJ · 11 hold-
a-1•1· 111~h rit 4' 11 1-r~ i. p , 1111 .uhl. 11_,, l111r• ur l}O f ~ ' l.l111r1 f l \i'i 
:riol' 1r10r 11 ,r~u fiv · la i ,u I c•d d ~H:1 n- . 
1r~;.&:1. ll" . ' [' I . l' JP \' I i, ,4 r•f da (l l 1•~•,t•tb.u,1.,. " , • • , rt l...11111! j., I or 
d4t l tO 1,p ly 1o :111y p I' . rn ~•r.t,l'I')' ' <r r1 11 :i rt1" 12lnr hm,i11 iuf~:; d~:' 
, • 1 • , II I u, r t I rt i 11 1 - • \' " 1 i, · l I h ii i u Wi l 
tb ,J :tJqioiu i 111 111 ,J' ilw 
l•\,·\•1· pr•r~Htt ~, Ito . 11 11 ~, • • , ... •~HI' • t If 1·111-
1,.h1)' f H hi1·•1 ,1rir1I ◄•,· n lin1 111,011 :11 y 
i I 
t I I 
11 II 
l' \i' nt rc,111t1I~; 
. 
p11 II 1'4 l !lft] I' 
h_\ it11I 1,11 i1"tt1U lll!Jt1I h 1 t 1;,, ~•, 11 111,Jl' j:,i I 
1•1 I y l1 ,,t l1. 
... .. - • •• ....... ...=--. 
1\ ' p 1111· IHIII I ' 
1111• i l ltrl\• 
. 
tt 
apu:fr. or iwm,raurl,r 11LUh .. 1 ◄] lal1,•l the~ atn•. r1r JH11 l!l 1 llll-
tn1r lt1bel. timrp. 01• oth- r d1•:--1~1111ti1 •11 nf c,:mtPnl . upon 11ny 
l111 . . lmtUt•. 111 otht>r prn•k:r!!'14:. . 1•unt:1itJin~ .my dru.r,.. or llll'~ii-
cint. ., or -uh hHll•,, :1 difft·r ut :1r1i1 I,· (or 1111.r u icl pr•-
.:-cribl'd or ordor d. ur po • 11 p ll u-re:i11~r or lf>-~ ri11untit~~ 11f 
any :1rtfoh· than 1h11t ,,.- •~r.rib ·d nr on i•rt>,f. or ttlhc1u+- • rl •-
,·h\lt' from 111 • t 1•u1 "' of rh1• pn· eri1,1io.n or unlcr , hid1 11 • 
ur1fi,,1 f ;Lkl"l! t-,, nltcq~, it, l"'uc i·411~nC\! l•f \\ l:ii,:b lmm~w lif nt· 
hl'~hh i~ 1~11d:1rmerNL ,., g,ult_,. of u 011 ·ih•Ul(l11nor. ,~r if ch-11 h 
n ... ut~". r"' .:uilt_v r;f n fi•ltmy. 
§ ~.-,7 ;1 . ·} Ev,•ry 1w~,m 'l\)w, iu ptdtia;: 111,.irty h:t!!. l"ULttuir t • 
P ' •>ll a11t, l,:d1• . hoxr h:1n- Lor ,,t ht•C p1ml-.. i1g ... lln~ 11011" , .• ltvn. '1\11◄ 11, ci1111c. • ,., 
• ~ •• :i, .. e'linJ,::t "' t!rrt rn. liu v, f r oth r ,. •ood ui--ualh· <1id 111 hH~ .... . I ,al ... ho:\ ~. -"oiP 11t•1.•H:r 
- · • · · •6ML7 'll't-l .:ht 
barrt·l,i, or p::c-k:,.,, .. by in:.i:,r-ht. pm,, i11 •lr 1• ,., • • al 1}1nPir1 :!/;t'"wn,w 
:m,yt~1iue- ,rl11rt~v r, l'11r tlu• purpo~ · o · i11,·r~~1 .. ing t ltt woi,rht \- hL 
uf uch ht~". 1,ale. Im~. hmrt•l, urpu ·kw.!~· , i~ 1rnm h:ihlc hr ~1 
lint• r:if hH·nl ,·-1in:! clol ' :cri, f ,r ;11·b nffl'r i•f•. 
f 1,j 7 I . l > l~, ery pi'r .. otJ ,, hn :1,du !tN-r1u• ,,r I lilut • ~,1 .. 1:, rac11s • 
uny artirlv t•t food . drink~ rtru!! . m t1ici1rc. i:ipiril11n11;;: or uutlt i1~;~,~~fi.' 
1ittnur. or wim•. or auy :r1tid~ 11-.eful in ,·<•mµn11ndintt i b• m. 
\\ itl1 11 fnuuluknl inl ·nl u, 11fft r rlw l'>ltnH' o r •·.111-. nr p ·rntit 
it l (• ht• off e1 eel for 4 ;Jlu ti" 11 um:faU ~ttt1 t·d tll ~1111 lJIUtNL. :1111.l 
f•\' •ry pt>r~on t, bi t fruudUlt>u ly di . or· k te,p, Qr ,>fft"rt fo1 
Nde th anie, a• 1mmhLlle1 al 1l or u11d ih1t~il. i •~uill)· ,lf :1 
mit1ilc•uu:-trnor. 
,,._ • • · - - ......,ll 
§ •H>H4. r~t>) gvery po.raot1 rcnlnining pltt48elll, nt tho phice R.t;mn1ulllJf 
f ' l O I 1 l f- ' I · .. · h 'b J)r<tlt@ft& Jl,t o t1uy rtot, rout, or u o ,aw·.a u iosti!OUl-> y. n tna· ,,i 10 gnu, · · ns iecn i,ll'lem ut rtot. 
• . . . , . (I,(:,' af!!i'.f 
htwful1 v wn1rru~,1 t.<> d1tIJpc·r~e, exc>eJ,t puhlw offit,~riS nnd f->er• ~1,rmLmt w 
•· · ~ 1,JIIEJJtfblfSUSI 
~on8 ns"it,ting t ho.m hi alttlunptiug t~o di~perM,a the Hau1c, itiJ 
vJ ~uilty of a n11~dm:neai:u,r~ 
§ .:l!J~a.; .. r~m, Jf ft tnagistrate or oflioer, having notice of itusrte!ltr.nt.1 
l f 1 1o bl . 1 , . 1J1v,gh1t:.~ttni1 or ru, uu flW u or ruoturaij :ia:setu y. rucutH)ll(,"(,1 n1 Uu~ Chapter. 3'r"ft1tti'.1bg to 
u.Jl't;jtflf9CI 
u(•~ lN:~ts to pr(•cn~<td tu tbe pluwt~ nf us.t'iCJn bly. or n~ neur there- r6ot.tfi). 
~o u,.q IH~ t1ruu with ~nfety, v11nd t,n t~xerd~e tho authority witb 
whit~h ho iH hn·c~tec.11 for f-Ul)J>irc~ing the S!Ul.uc nnd u.11t"t~t.ing 
t hu offendcrij, lie h1' guilty of 1.1 1nitidcn10Jutor. 
§ ,& :;UH~ (~,in Eve.ry per~on who a1ut,11i~e~ in, iruJtigaitcs, lltyl10 ~lbcs,, 
(•ncouragc~, or proanot.es ''"·'' rh1g ,,r pri_:,_.p tight. or any other 
pr,.~rnt-ditatod fitrht or contention, ( witJ1ot1t. d,e,indly wrruapont:t ), 
f.'.'itbcr us p1•incip~al. nid, t«lcornd., u,upirt,, 8U1rg4,..10u~ 01· other .. 
~ wi~(~. i~ llunisbimble hy impriMonm_(Hit,- iu the penitentiary not 
•~xee-ediug two yc~srfil. 
f 4.Mf 1. '~111> }~v<.iry 1,erf.lon wilfully pre~ent n.s a tstpcc- Pivre1•Da pNJo 
vD tntA•r =~t. nny fight or contention n1c.nU,,ned in tht1 p1·,,cedi111g i;ti~ pr~~o 
H4~etion, i~ ~111ilty of a 111i~den1eau1or. 
~ 
§ •!508. <~11-'1-~ Every pe1·~on who 1nt1Ucious1y and wUfuHy 1uutiu.rlb11nglt~~ 
dhdurb~ U1t3 peace or c-iui(~t or ~ny u~ighborhoodt fa,ruily t or p¢tu('~ .. 
p,ehu,nt by loud ,1r, Ut'tlU8Ut1l noil1-le, or by t.nnnaltnou'11" or offen= 
11'ive •~orHluet, or by threateuing, trniducing, c1uurr~U11g, chal-
lt~nging to tight., or fighting, iH puni~buhlo by fine not, ox<~-+d-
in~ two huudrcd dolhb.rM, 01· by iunpriacuuneut. iu t.b,, · oounty 
juil not exceeding two n1onths. 
i 45!HL f:1»4) J-r "'"') or tllf\N~ JH!f't;:.h'l!ll&.: ll&,n.ullf-nhDa .,,.'a • l'l.n. 
I 
I_ JURY DISAGREf.S, .. 
I On Monday or thls week, Messrs D. A. Ducbannon, Charles Robinette and I William Halling were baled lt!to Jus-
1 
lice Christensen's court charged with. 
violating the city ord!nanca. The de-
fendants were arrested for peddling: 
j fn1lt at the 0. S. L. Ra!lroad station,. 
: !n violation o! Sec. 83 or Chapter 18: 
! oC the City Ordir.ance, which rea<b as: I follows, ",\ny person who shall ply any· 
I vocation upon the platform or ground 
o! any railroad company, •• • • • wltb.-
1 out the consent or said company • • • • 
! shall, upon ccn viction lhcrco!, he p:in-
1 
!shed by a fine o! not less than /Ive nor· 
mora than one hundred dollars Cor 
I 
each oll'cnse." 
The defendants demanded a jury 
. trial nnd four c!tlzens were secured to · 
pnss upon t11e evidence prcsente~. The 
city called a number or witnesses to 
prove thnt the defendants had been 
I selling fruit on the station platform 
on the east side or the tracks and !t 
was also brought out that the railroad 
company bad granted the sole priv!-
lege ot selling fruit on its property to 
Knudson Dros. The defense ~rgued 
that lo as much as tl'.e city sold the de-
fendants a llcense to peddle fruit nt 
the depot, the city was morally obi!· 
&ated to protect them In their rights 
nnd see that they bad tlie privilege 
or selling frnlt., 
Tho case went to the jurr In , the 
forenoon on Monday and the jury got 
"hung" abortly nrter retiring_ They" 
I deliberated until nfght foll and then 
notified the Court thnt It was lmpos• 
s lhlo to asre·e on a ,·erdict. One held. 
1 out for the enforcement of the city or-I tllnance and the otber three stood a-
l i;nlnst the city. The Justice, upon be• 
j in:; advised or the condition discbarg-
1 
e<1 the jury and \hen dlschnrgcd the 
defendants nnd so the case ended. 
1 No llttfe discussion has been caused 
I by the proceedlnss' and the turn ot 
I ' 
' nlrnlrs ri.nd senUmeut cnn be found rav• 
l orlni;"botb sides. 
J101iu• lour1 . 
T1,, f J.t,winc t~.-•!n--• •~ I.kn, .. 
In Jutti(,, l - ,,.., • .. c,~rt In ..:u11,-
l•f 1.-t~ 
J'o.n- J j •'talhJIO.::. ,~ ,Ju f'llq; h.1 
, c:. U. W. 1 .. ,. c-ar, "'M fiu._ ! It.!•, 
,y, J,id1 h• 11 UJ tor In l"-11\Jr. 
Wm. C. ' l ar•J1 ._-u rt..twJ .t11+ fur 
1-.: h ·-t \l:uu' ,,,btrl.l be •ill"""''• 
... rt. 
1".-b .. ,~ r U-.twin,; tJll-...j~ .. wa.• 
~ ........ 
Tbl· 0,- ,.J J l.>bD \\'•t-TOUJJ, 
am-.,,J ,,u • t'lu.tt~of di.,,-l.i.Srt_•Ju,: 
t,h .. llt<!l"T .. k ilt! 'Ill h\t W,.>k ll-U .-.a:1 • I 
Julf ••• i .. r(l.(lt I H t«J:.:r. 
Tr, .au,. Jl.rau J•h,a1Jf:'ll 1:oilty t,, :. 
fh:alg<'d~IW}, 111nu " "' ~ o-
, ......... a Uh..of'lt a h1o1t~Gt.. I (iaznl ~lu•J" wt;, rn;:ui.rul 
an•1"cr Liu• .-~~uh•ll LO• , bn~ ut 
Jnrni..t":tl~ 11.- "'~ f": U1'.lc'1.nt 
"j~1~:;t.~,:Uuh0a IAA!- ~r>f04 - i _for 
•l~oh~ttss-. atJil #,!t kt\ by (.~. 
1\....- k. w., out1 hk an,-..\.:t' tn • 1,L.-
c::taar..;r • .._. t ,rfdLrd. 
c~. ~ lftlth. J •o.- Gr«o :u,,j 
\\a!:, r t:: DJ••J' ~JJIIMld bl &n•afr 
,,at-hat_. ,.f Jtttlbn••·•u:r-
Th"" f,...111a• lt JC w~n- tl:JOEI .,) d--h 
(. rdr..tn\.O'\IHW A. Hu~o . .... II . 
1• .. • n,,i •u.. \\"m. Ii IJftU.. Jan1u, 
hmllb aid Jaa:u )lAllu~ 
t;~ ..~~.1!:i o';.u~: :~~:-: 
>CM"!..)' J ut:tUl tlli.•af\.r-.rao: n. 
i't1ll•t ,-..rt. I 
f t •t•td:llJ •11.H,- 11 tf1• I) •Uh# ' 
11 • ,.. "'" ' ,1 I i ill Y~ , • • 1t • 
)h,••lrr, 1b11t.,• J ,. v, '° ""''• II>" 1.. . ,,11 .. tt " , ... ,,,. I 
...... , , ... , .... " • J ... ,,◄ ,. J i. 
lh t ·as ... A J•,n I •, a,,u ,. •• 
Ut11• t ••.&11tll ""''" IL• Ai"''f•r I " 
.......... ,1 I '11 ;,.,, ,-;i,i.l,cH• ►o[(U 'I " 
•u,J"kl. I i.• • .. wUI l!"l'ri, '"I' •t 
t !o.l4Jh,:11r• 1h1t• 
J IH I ap I Ii~ IM \ r.TSII • 
A 1i ._ •lft••f tr11- I •• 
I• ,!lu It.• i ilt.o.- 1Htl hf Rt-
dU'• lf-lJ'i t,..,,Ju,11111 , I, 1s,, r •••• 
! bit iW"1l• " \YJIIIMP', i!'._attl ,1 11 
tr.1£'•':.io 
~; ,-e 
lltauit, tJ S J Ul l r1111l. I 1•• 1H •"'I I . I U1t1I"• 
UL ull•• •• nJ1,u ,. \\ 1 S'f"'· 
n, It. \ c 1t.lhU \11,•I' • •• • • 
•u .C t ··••Ill :111 "'"•hi ,Jt l>Y omo-1 
ll•"lt C•tilC•l "' lll,lbt ,il ldt• •• 
fh·t • ,! :l" a o111 1~ Uu, r,>llt,o Cf'tU, 
1 r 1,-.. Jl'tllllf n.u,·um'-'W '" 11,t 
Ii .,yll•1 11 a1tJ C~t>• _ ~ )di 
•llt. I\ , ~7 fou, I.II\ I •I• 
• • k •U•IC~tJ, h• l"I • 
.,,,: • )1'll" Olf "7 UU'.!1>111>\lh't• 
J 11, ,,1.i. \t,1r, 1,~1-. 111:I , J.onta I• 
I II•• •• u· ti h u,,e--. I , .. II I. 
1, ,uni , . 1 h , 1U • •""" '"•' tu 
••,Uhl ••l;,4.l "'• .,, lt•I• lfh.•," .,,,,. 
11'1• I• t,o 41' I,., ·lhi 11, l1• ti'tO I•~ It 
lnl·(Offl ,u,rn,h, • 1•oJ"r-tMll u I 
1W • lliw,. t, ,,.,.a l• • •t" M•'fl f C. 
• Cll"a f'; U •1 J l,,o ·r 1 l fl IU• 
tU•f ti: f , 11 •1• r•II 11111:1 a t\ l 
l'ohu t •art ~•lu. 1 
lhl1.t.1 Atrlli~· • D lltJuo o looo 
IC"• fl•I Ila,, .. " ,u .. e l t11r •ll" •h11 
h,m•I~ , .. bl• ,,:,~• •• \/J11n ... ·"• ' 
i ,, w. u .. ~ m 11., .• 11 Jlltf Ulal •l 
t- c.1e.1on. h.t1:o t11i1• . j 
1 .. ,UI 1Jnla., • C h l ll . ... c 111a1,blu t or• 
1.n,.i tt-1 l et k • • i-h1r • tu, u,., w t11k-
1uu .. \,•uu,o • !:IJ .,, .... u1,i10., 
,_..,,. t "uuJ 1,~lllJ JI PfOIUU1IU1U •U I 
l'fn• I f'.:11 •1o.:11, 
J itbt, 11~1.11••• Ill• W &tl Wh\l a IDW 
11., • • • • I .I. J"ffffiJ n1.a h.• 1Hu .. , lU 1-
hlUIC, .... coaamlll•J l" th, (' , UQIJ 
1•11 I "'"'• Ulfl• lO ••••U l•lil'2111& .. 
b"tlalC ... , . Ill<> U,tillr, 
l'•ltrr t1ntr1. 
llu•la..-•• ... • rrr lll(lll h i lh• I'••· 
Oo. .o\,tl lf,;hr. 1•• th&tt"tll U • 
U t..l"J . .... , u IJau.r Jh7 ti1'1t'll ·" 
Jlu }O)U.,, • ••ft' h•rll • l.', lkHlt i. 
t.1111.1•..tfl , 1111•••••c~•1" w. u. 
u., .. ,. •.,. a .. , S\ ,~ 111 , ...... •. 
, .. u., ' " 1o1 1tw,~ t,1 l t .J ,:1tlh1. A l 
, .. ,. .. llr041 , ., ... , . 1.-. 11• ••• 1:.,.~ .. 
ti J-,r7 111• Ill •kt• • 1• 
T,tl, 11,Jt, , 1n1t. 
l-t1atJ H l ... -, u 1,) u b,h; 
"11.-■11 .. 1 I ••• lh • f.1114-t, 
l I \ ( t,ll,-.11 • I J, J 11,r\lt♦ Wth 
l,;tJtlll HJlti un u1.i.1 h1•all; - -~ J tJ• 
0 • •ti• "ll'i( ti • ltlllut ii hinp Ju• 
• \'Ol.1 • r,J •••• f: 11 b • • 1 Jt....q~111·1 
f ...., I• IA It• lff>•""◄ 'I• 
1 1 c- , 91 , ,11~• • J 1·. a • 111,r, \\' 
r U • ••• , ,wJ t h u w,m,., ,,., 
'-•' • I·•• ' er.,..,,~, •htu,rih,., th• 
........ 1,, • "" • "'O•tlt<i., J 1111111 Ju r Jl. 
W• hr Ut C'\ui+UI(• , • ..ulJI••• .,., 
tl 'f.,Ji1fo1 Jnual,••t .. ,a. 
1,,~ ""'"" 1 ,~., , .,,,. 1'\ J o• • .M •f• 
111 JI "' •• Uh,d U1lt , t • U•O ,. I • · f• 1111 
f\llT r . .. rb u ar~•• l'I ,. l•UHI. 
a.., • .. t f ►1111111.• J .. 1a.,a1 .. Jlt1U, ..f, 
A 11,ari .. J • J ,bo H. t ,-. •r,J J tui 
\\'. llwn • • •t• r .,,~.-l t.-, ~•f•• • 
• oo.i J I O .wu.t ai.d J b • J 11~~• f r 
I UH• I,. ... , .. 11°n. J , II, II t'UDJ4b. • i:h"'1 ,.h • i-♦r. "''" lt>• ntil$! 1• 1rila., .,.,,. 111.-. u. , ... , • • 11••1 ·" 111 : ... , O,ip. 11111t..,, • •• N •o \01t.81r._ • u 1 tic--,,.J 
In I • I ., ut.:.11.,1 , .. .,, •II fE Ylli 
IUJ , 1u,dr•1:••"• ........... Ja.1 
. -~i.'"• • W ht 0 111 ... uu IJ lf lUILI• 
J •• M,11111 • to,.,_~ 1h11 • \ll-'!..1 (o 1h.-
d• ., .... ..... •l•••J ti< • 1 i,;lt •t•.-J ~h"' 
tAI• 11 ..ct 1 -1,. t w\Wluc , \ \. n , \"1111..1, 
tnUII• I II., ,.t .. u ;i... lll \J I a .. , .. ... 
c.-ru1t ■ ••1eu1U '• -•1 c.•• 11·ho • • aka 
1,11,, • thUC"" • C•t1t•l .thu1 •• o. Wntt 
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